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INTRODUCTION 
 
With the fall of the USSR and the collapse of the command economy system, the West 
has witnessed the emergence of several new countries on the world map and several 
new players on the economic scene. These countries seemed to emerge overnight from 
shadow onto the stage of world politics and into the game of world economics. Many of 
them actively turned to the West, and most of them have aimed to open up their former 
so closed economies, constructing their policies, right from the beginning of the 1990s, 
to attract foreign direct investments (FDI), in an attempt to heighten employment, 
welfare and local production.  
FDI inflow comes with many advantages to economies. It can promote economic 
growth, raise employment and technological level of a country, but it is a complicated 
game with the risk of designing the policies, so the foreign companies get all the gain 
and the host economy none. “The difference between having the right and the wrong 
government policies has never been greater” [Summers 1995]. There has been a general 
fear that multinational corporations (MNC) are becoming more and more powerful, but 
despite the growing concern among certain people, most governments nevertheless 
welcome them to their countries, in the hope that they will bring with them power and 
prosperity. The Asian tiger’s tremendous success based on openness to trade and 
investments, combined with a low tax base, have proved that openness is a more 
successful path to choose. “If there is one thing worse than being exploited, it is not 
being exploited at all” said Joan Robinson [Kerr 1997:4] and the CEE countries try their 
best to be the new economic tigers.   
World FDI inflows over the last two decades have more than tripled [Narula and 
Portelli 2004:2]. While the West fights to keep its domestic firms on national grounds, 
the economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) compete hard to attract outsourcing 
companies and their share of FDI. According to the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) 2001 report, most changes in national FDI 
policies during the 90s focused on promotion of FDI and incentives. Around 95% of 
those changes were favourable to foreign investors [UNCTAD 2001: 6-7]. In terms of 
regulatory trends relating to investment, the pattern observed in previous years has 
persisted: the bulk of regulatory changes have facilitated FDI. This has involved 
simplified procedures, enhanced incentives, reduced taxes and greater openness to 
foreign investors [Ibid. 2006:9]. FDI policy framework consists of an intricate web of 
policies in many layers, and while some transition countries have great success 
attracting FDI, others trail far behind. In this game investment environment and 
incentive instruments are of outmost importance. In order to retrieve the best host 
country gains, value judgment is are called for. Being liberal is no longer enough in the 
game of attracting FDI, a unique policy portfolio and a stable, attractive investment 
climate are needed.  
 
The objective of this thesis is to analyse the investment environment and incentive 
schemes in order to elaborate proposals about the appropriate FDI policy for the CEE 
countries, here represented by Estonia, Hungary, Romania and The Republic of 
Moldova1. In order to achieve the objective the following research tasks have been set: 
• To provide the theoretical background for the main motives and strategies 
connected with FDI both of the investor and the host country 
• To investigate and present the theoretical background for incentive policies in 
regard to FDI 
• To compare and contrast the overall investment environment in four selected 
case countries by using selected indicators and comparing the findings to FDI 
per capita 
• To compare and contrast the principal incentive policies employed in four 
selected case countries with a special focus on fiscal policies 
• To present, compare and analyse the results 
• Make proposals about the appropriate FDI policy for the case countries 
 
The thesis consist of two parts, firstly the study focuses on the theoretical background of 
the investigated topic. It will present definitions and descriptions of theoretical models 
and concepts important for the understanding of FDI, as well as listing and describing 
the policy tools and incentives used in political design to attract FDI.  
                                                 
1
 Further in this text the Republic of Moldova will be referred to simply as Moldova. 
The second part of the thesis gives empirical evidence of the issues investigated in the 
theoretical part. Firstly, an introduction to the overall investment climate in the CEE 
transition countries will be given, followed by a broad analysis of the investment 
environment (IE) in the case countries. The methodology in the broad analysis will 
compress indicators of investment environment into eight synthetic indicators in order 
to limit the analysis and present a more clear and structured picture. The eight indicators 
are chosen to convey aspects focusing on the crucial locational advantages important to 
investors, when determining where to invest. Those eight aspects include market size, 
labour force, infrastructure, stability and growth, corruption, freedom, ease of doing 
business and competitiveness and innovation. The findings will be compared to FDI per 
capita in the final paragraph.  
After the broad approach, a more narrow approach will be used to compare and contrast 
the use of financial, fiscal and other incentives within the case countries2. As fiscal 
incentives are the primary tool of developing economies, there will be a specific focus 
on the use of those. As incentive policies are a distinct and intertwined policy group, it 
is not possible to successfully apply a ranking scale similar to the one designed in the 
previous chapter, therefore the incentives will instead simply be described, compared 
and contrasted and a qualitative evaluation will be used. 
The thesis finishes with a short discussion of the future of FDI incentives and polices in 
Central and Eastern Europe, before concluding remarks. 
  
The case countries chosen are Estonia, Hungary, Romania and Moldova and have been 
selected to represent a wide spectrum of CEE countries3 both geographically, in size and 
economy, as well as concerning policy. The first three countries represent a cross-
section of the latest EU accession countries: Estonia named the Baltic tiger for its rapid 
economic reforms, liberal, non-interventionist stance and impressing growth rate.  
Hungary, an early-leader in attracting FDI, until 1993 the only CEE country to receive 
any substantial FDI. Of the second newer enlargement round Romania is interesting due 
to its large size and rather promising inflow of FDI. As the final target country, not yet 
                                                 
2
 This thesis focuses on government incentives and so incentives offered by local municipalities are only 
loosely touched upon. 
3
 Moldova is in some cases classified as South-East Europe, as apposed to Central Eastern Europe, 
however in this work it will be referred to as a Central Eastern European State. 
EU member, Moldova was chosen to act as a contrast case. FDI in Moldova remains 
low, not only due to a small market, but also due to an unpredictable environment.  
The empirical data was collected on the base of available statistics and surveys. When 
comparing statistics on this topic, it is important to keep the vulnerability of the source 
material in mind. UNCTAD and Eurostat are the base for most statistical input used, but 
they in turn compile their statistics, on FDI, based on national international sources that 
often compile and register their figures differently. The standardisation of data is still an 
ongoing process, and it is important to note that accounting practises and valuation 
methods differ between nations. As an example, some countries do not include the 
collection of data on reinvested earnings in their statistics, while some do.  
Furthermore, policy decisions, especially in transition countries, can change often and 
rapidly, by the time some decisions have been published, translated and available, they 
might already be outdated. Moldova has empirically shown to be a challenge due to 
lacking available material in English about policies and figures. However, this study 
strives to be as accurate and updated as possible with the sources available and practical 
limitations given. 
 
  
 
 
1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENTS 
 
 
1.1. Classifications of Foreign Direct Investments 
FDI is transfer of capital across borders and can roughly be defined as a long-term 
investment by a foreign direct investor in an enterprise resident in an economy other 
than that in which the foreign direct investor is based [UNCTAD 2007]. For an 
investment to be categorised as a foreign direct investment, it needs a minimum of two 
actors: a parent enterprise and a foreign affiliate, which together form a transnational 
corporation (TNC). The TNC comprises of reinvested earnings, equity capital and other 
capital, for instance intra-company loans. Furthermore, to distinguish FDI from foreign 
portfolio investment, FDI must be undertaken with the intention of the parent enterprise 
to exercise control over the foreign affiliate [Ibid.]. To have control, or otherwise 
formulated to have an effective voice, does not mean that the parent enterprise has 
absolute power over the enterprise, only that they are able to influence the management. 
The UN defines control in this case as owning 10% or more of the ordinary shares or 
voting power of an incorporated firm, or its equivalent, for an unincorporated firm. In 
addition, the OECD suggests a threshold of 10% of equity ownership to qualify an 
investor as a foreign direct investor [Ibid.]. However, the thresholds value for foreign 
ownership various between countries and some do not even specify a threshold point. In 
turn, those countries take into account other evidence proving whether an investing 
company keeps an effective voice in the foreign firm, in which it has an equity stake. 
Keeping an effective voice may also include subcontracting, management contracts, 
turnkey arrangements, franchising, leasing, licensing and production sharing. In the 
large picture, which threshold is set influences little due to the large quantity of FDI 
invested into majority-owned foreign affiliates [Ibid.]. The subsidiary into which the 
investment is made is called a "direct investment enterprise", and once a such is 
established, one has to identify, which capital flows between entities in other 
economies, and the enterprise need to be classified as FDI. Classified as FDI are the 
reinvestment of earnings and the provision of long-term and short-term intra-company 
loans (between parent and affiliate enterprises), as well as equity capital. Only capital 
provided through other enterprises related to the investor, or provided by the direct 
investor directly, qualifies as FDI [Ibid.].  
FDI can be divided into five different type based on the entry mode choice of the 
foreign investor:  
 
Greenfield Investments: Among the host countries policy makers Greenfield 
investments are the most popular type of investments, as they cover direct investment 
into expansion of facilities or into new facilities. This flow of money is hoped to create 
new production capacity and work places, as well as create linkages to the international 
market and transfer knowledge and technology from the foreign-owned companies to the 
host economy. However Greenfield investments do not necessarily add to the productive 
capacity of the host country, at least not initially, as profits tend to flow back to the 
mother company as apposed to into the host country economy [Ibid. 2000:29]. 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions: Mergers and Acquisitions are the most dynamic part of FDI 
world-wide, in developed economies it totalled a share of 74% of all FDI by the turn of 
the millennium [Antalocy and Sass 2001:2]. Mergers and Acquisitions consist of a 
simple transfer of existing assets from local firms to foreign firms. Cross-border mergers 
happen, when a new legal entity is established by the combining of assets or operations 
from existing companies in other countries. Cross-border acquisitions are the process of 
assets or operations being moved to a foreign company from a local company, followed 
by the local entity transforming itself into an affiliate of the foreign firm. Although 
mergers and acquisitions are the most dynamic, they are also among the least popular in 
host countries and are often met with an air of concern as ownership transfers from host 
country to foreign hands. They provide no long term benefits for the host economy, and 
the merger or acquisition is often followed by restructuring, which more often than not 
means cutting down on the number of employees [UNCTAD 2000:27]. It also does not 
add to productive capacity in the host nation, however if the policy base of a nation is 
well designed and addresses the negative effects, mergers and acquisitions can become 
be a gain for foreign investors and host economy both [Ibid. 2000:35]. 
 
Brownfield projects: Brownfield is not as well-established a term in entry mode choice 
as the other categories, as it only made its own entry into the vocabulary in the end of 
the 90s. However, it cannot be ignored, when talking about the case of transitional 
countries. Brownfield investments are a hybrid entry form between Greenfield 
investments and acquisitions. Where Greenfield projects create a completely new 
company moulded to suit the investors specific interests, but with a gradual market entry 
process, acquisitions acquire already working companies. When acquired the investor 
gains direct access to the new market, but with distinctions not necessarily suiting the 
investor company’s build-up [Meyer and Estrin 1998:4]. In such cases the foreign 
investor will often acquire an already established company but completely remodel it, 
replacing everything from organizational structure, labour force, product line and 
equipment, so that only the name and customer relations are left, and in some cases not 
even those [Ibid. 1998:6]. In short, Brownfield investments are acquired firms so rebuild 
that they seem to be a Greenfield investment [Ibid. 1998:4].  
 
Horizontal FDI: When a company decides to invest in the same industry abroad as it 
operates in at home, it is defined as a horizontal foreign direct investment [Waldkirch 
2003]. It means that the same production activities occur simultaneously in several 
different countries, however the headquarters will most likely remain in the home 
country. In certain cases the horizontal investment is simply a starting stage, before a 
company switches its production facilities completely to be foreign based. The change 
will happen, when it becomes more cost effective to produce all goods locally instead of 
exporting it [Chandler et al. 2003:22]. While the vertical FDI is considered a supplement 
to trade, the horizontal approach substitutes international trade and creates more jobs in 
the host economy than the vertical approach. Where Meyer and Estrin introduced the 
Brownfield concept to the studies of FDI, Markusen was the “father” of horizontal FDI 
[Markusen 1984]. 
 Vertical FDI: In Vertical FDI, a company locates various stages of its production in 
different regions or countries, determining the location based on an evaluation of where 
the specific production stage can be done most cost effectively [Aizenman and Marion 
2001]. The head quarters however are, just as with horizontal FDI, most likely to remain 
in the home country. Vertical FDI is typically represented in manufacturing, especially 
in case of electronics equipment, textiles or clothing. In the case of electronics, they will 
be manufactured in one location, but assembled in another [Chandler et al. 2003:22]. 
Vertical FDI can be broken down into forward and backward. Forward vertical FDI is, 
when a company’s domestic production is being sold by an industry abroad. Whereas 
when a company’s domestic production process is provided with inputs from an industry 
abroad, it is defined as backward vertical FDI [Waldkirch 2003]. By involving 
sometimes several countries or several domestic firms in a host economy, vertical FDI 
creates many linkages and also complement trade. 
 
1.2. Motivation of Foreign Direct Investments 
 
Companies can have many and varied motives for investing abroad. Where policy-
makers might hope for evening out imbalances and reducing their debts, companies in 
turn hope for higher turnover, due to lower production costs. Most often factors in their 
home environment spark the wish to go abroad. These factors are labeled push factors. 
Empirical research performed by UNCTAD in relation to push and pull factors 
determine that the largest push factors are high production costs related to for instance 
the rising cost of labour, larger competition from domestic, as well as foreign, 
companies and small domestic markets. In some cases, the wish to locate abroad also 
comes from a wish to reduce risk, this is naturally predominant in companies from 
developing or otherwise economical or political instable companies [UNCTAD 
006:156-157]. 
Various researchers have applied a wide variety of definitions in order to understand 
motives of companies. Narula and Dunning [2000], Dunning [1993] and UNCTAD 
[2006] combine the proposed means into four classifications of foreign investors based 
on their investment motives.  All four motivators are strongly reliant on pull factors 
within the host economy. 
Resource Seeking: Resource seeking investments are most often found in developing 
countries. Resources have over time been the most important pull factor in attracting 
foreign investors into low-capital countries. However the primary sector output has 
diminished and much of the world’s material is now being controlled by state-owned 
enterprises. This has lead about the change that foreign participation in these ventures is 
less likely to happen via FDI and more likely to happen via non-equity arrangements 
[UNCTAD 1998:31-32]. The seeked resources include labour force, minerals, oils and 
others. Companies most often seek production factors more favourable than those in the 
home country in an attempt to reduce costs or to take advantages of natural resources 
not available there [Lall and Narula 2004:6]. These kinds of investments can result in 
many linkages between host and home country. The horizontal FDI described in the 
above paragraph often comes in the form of resource seeking investments. 
Market seeking: Expanding one’s markets is a common goal of investing abroad, and 
the investing into transition economies often happens based on a market-seeking motive 
[Lall and Narula 2004:6], triggered by the decision that a market can best be served or 
reached by a physical presence as apposed to export or licensing. [Varblane 2000:2]. 
These investments are often made to maintain or penetrate new markets, expand 
existing ones, compete with other firms or simply to discover new grounds. The 
decision can also be designed in an effort to circumvent protectionist tariff barriers or 
other government imposed market distortions.  
Restructuring and efficiency seeking: Companies will restructure their already 
existing foreign production in an attempt to optimise and create higher efficiency and 
profitability [Lall and Narula 2004:6]. It is a tool of restructuring or sometimes 
expanding [Ibid. 2004:2]. They will normally seek to use the advantage of entering into 
developed countries with low production costs and using economies of scale and scope, 
or they will focus on more industrialised developing economies, as they have stringent 
capability needs [Ibid. 2004:6]. Investments like these tend to come as additional 
investments and have a rather different host country effect compared to market seeking 
investments, which bring an inflow of resources, management capacities and 
technology, as it attributes its affiliates with cross-border organizational directions 
[Varblane 2000:3]. This kind of investments thrives best in an environment of free trade 
and low government imposed barriers. For the host economy efficiency seekers are the 
most beneficial investor type, as their activities produce spillover effects, promote 
export and improve the competitive environment [Varblane and Ziacik 1999:179].  
Strategic Assets seeking (also known as new asset seeking): Companies investing in 
the hope of creating higher efficiency and profitability, looking for products, innovative 
ideas or even market expertise or distribution networks fall in the Strategic Assets 
Seeking category. They will often be attempting to protect their market position by 
protecting, advancing or sustaining their position. The later often happens in 
competitive intensive sectors such as capital, information or technology [Dunning 
1992]. 
 
 While the three first categories can be grouped together, as they are all using existing 
firm-specific assets and attempting to generate economic gain by exploiting those 
assets, this final category focuses on attracting or developing new assets altogether in 
order to generate more assets or protect already existing ones. Companies with new 
assets seeing motives are unlikely to enter into developing countries [Lall and Narula 
2004:6].  
 
 
 
 
The eclectic paradigm (OLI Framework) and The Investment development Path 
(IDP) 
 
One of the most well known theories in FDI is the so-called Eclectic paradigm, whose theory was introduced by Dunning in 1977 at 
a Nobel Symposium in Stockholm [Dunning 2001:1] and has been developed further by Dunning during the following decades. 
Despite some criticism, it is still widely applied today, mostly under its nickname the OLI model, named after its three components: 
Organisation, Location and Internationalisation. This framework can be used to explain why MNC’s choose to invest abroad as 
apposed to for instance licensing or outsourcing certain facilities. Dunning himself [2001:4] argues in his more recent writings that 
the eclectic paradigm’s strong suit lies within analysing the determinants of international production, rather than being applied as a 
predictive theory of the MNE qua MNE. In addition, he stresses that it is important to remember that no one theory can cover all 
aspects of foreign-owned value-added activity, as the motivations and expectations have too many variables [Ibid. 2001:4]. 
However, for this study the eclectic paradigm entail the suitable variables.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. OLI Framework  
Source: Composed by author 
 
The three components of the framework are meant to illustrate the three determinant factors evaluated upon by a MNC, when 
choosing its foreign location, after a decision to invest abroad has been made. Logically it most be beneficial for a company to go 
abroad and it bases its evaluation of benefits on ownership, location and internalisation advantages [Ibid. 1993, 2000 and 2001]. The 
combination of these three indicators should end in a positive result for the company such as an increase in overall productivity 
[Vahter and Masso 2005:7]. All three need to be fulfilled for FDI to flow, if only one is fulfilled, the company can choose other 
means of market entering such as licensing or exporting. 
 
Organisation advantages: Advantages of the company, which compensate for the additional costs it takes to establish an entity 
abroad in a foreign environment. In addition, the organisation needs to compensate their disadvantages facing the firm in 
comparison with local companies. Organizational advantages can be economies of scale, tariff privileges, political advantages, 
trademark recognition and inter-country sales links. 
 
Locational advantages (Pull factors): Locational advantages can also be labelled pull factors, as they pull the investor from the 
home economy towards the host economy as mentioned above. The advantages of the host country and its location include size of 
market, new market, macroeconomic environment, lower production costs, lower wages, savings on transport costs, supply of raw 
materials, tax advantages and spillovers. In general, locational advantages can be used to generate a larger profit for the company. 
 
Internalisation (Push factors): How the foreign company can take advantage of the two above-mentioned criteria by FDI rather 
than other methods such as licensing. Combined the method of FDI needs to provide a competitive advantage, possibly to avoid 
competition from local firms. This threat would be less, if the MNC keeps full control over their assets. Alternatively, the 
motivation can be the allure of penetrating a new sizable market or other motives mentioned in the previous chapter. In addition, 
push factors are important –maybe the economic environment in the home economy is not lucrative, maybe the wages have gone up 
or the political environment is turning unstable. 
 
In general, while all three determinants are vital from the investor’s point of view, the 
host country as such has relative little influence on step one and three, however 
locational advantages relies on host country characteristics and is crucial for the inflow 
of FDI into the host country. The more OLI advantages a company is likely to get from 
going abroad, the greater is the chance they will choose the model of FDI. The more 
OLI advantages a firm possesses the greater the propensity of adopting an entry mode 
with a high control level such as wholly owned venture.  
PUSH 
Ownership 
Location Internationalisation
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Country 
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Dunning has, as mentioned, developed this model further in response to critisism. In 
this setting, two of his attributions are important to include. Critics have voiced that the 
OLI framework does not take into account the impact of the situation, surroundings and 
the decision maker [Xuemin and Decker 2004:27]. That has lead to the incorporation of 
location specific determinants. Not just the locational advantages are variables, but one 
most take into account the relative importance of location specific determinants. They 
depend upon motive of investment, type of investment, sector of investment and size of 
investment. These determinants are all relative and due to change as the environment 
changes around them, this is important when determining investment policies, as what 
might be favourable to one region might not be so to another.  
The other contributions are the introduction of what Dunning [2001:8] names The 
Investment Development Path (IDP) and Narula [1996] defines as Stages in FDI inflow. 
The hypothesis behind IDP is that the OLI configuration changes together with five 
stages, which are meant to illustrate the various stages a country evolves through on its 
development path.  The stages are described shortly below: 
 
1. Pre-industrialization: Countries are not attractive for foreign investors as there are not 
enough locational advantages. The country itself is to poor to invest outside. Main 
companies able to compete for investments are located in raw material industries. Main 
aim of host country government is to guarantee economy with raw materials.  
2. The inflow of FDI starts to increase, but there is still a very low outflow. The domestic 
market starts to expand. Main target for foreign investors are still industries based on 
raw material and oriented to export. Cheap labour will be used heavily to market 
products for the investor home market. 
3. Gradual decrease of FDI and increase of outflow of investments. The domestic wages 
are growing and labour intensive production will diminish. Competition between 
domestic and foreign firms will start.  
4. Outflow and inflow of investments starts to balance. Domestic firms do not only 
compete with foreign firms on local markets but also start penetrating other markets. 
The service sector grows in importance also in relation to investments. Outflow will 
begin to exceed the inflow of investments. 
5. The balance between inflow and outflow starts to fluctuate. This is the situation 
advanced nations are reaching currently. Cross border transactions have an increasing 
prosperity internalised by MNEs. 
1.3. Host Country Effects of Foreign Direct Investments 
 
As illustrated many factors can be determining, when companies decide to invest 
abroad, as well as when policy makers aim their policies towards attracting FDI. 
However, the final goal for the companies and the policy makers are similar; they 
expect lucrative advantages. FDI is popular, because as apposed to for instance portfolio 
investments, it has a more long-term character. Governments in the host economy 
expect various positive effects from FDI such as capital and tax revenue, fuelling of 
economic growth and evening out of macroeconomic imbalances within the host 
economy. FDI can contribute to a more competitive environment, higher exports, job 
creation, spillover in the fields of knowledge and technology [Blomström and Kokko 
2003:2].  
Due to the liberalisation of markets, national governments have lost a significant share 
of the tools, they used to imply to promote welfare, local employment and 
competitiveness; therefore they turn to the instruments left for them such as FDI 
instruments [Ibid. 2003:3]. Although liberalisation has limited governments powers, it 
has likewise meant that market size has begun to be less important for attracting 
investments due to global and regional agreements [Ibid. 2003:2], so now even small 
markets can compete in the game, if they employ the right tools. The right tools 
combined with other market advantages can be labelled pull factors, as they are used as 
tools in order to pull companies inward. Empirical research performed by UNCTAD in 
relation to push and pull factors determines that the largest pull factors are liberal 
governments offering good opportunities to investors. That may include investments in 
infrastructure, transparency, political and economic stability. All in all liberalisation is 
the key seen from the host economy perspective [UNCTAD 2006:156-157]. Other 
positive effects of changing policies towards more open markets, are that in short terms 
the costs of incentive tools are hard to see, whereas the benefits of FDI; such as rise in 
employment and growth of economy are visible to the broad majority. Besides simply 
attracting capital, the policies gain popularity among the people as the growth of 
economy and links to other markets become apparent. These gains are also appealing to 
the policy makers in the CEE countries, who have in large numbers opened up their 
economies to the West in attempts to heighten employment, welfare and local 
production. In addition, incentives grow more generous with the change in climate 
[Easson 2001:272]. The hope of policy makers is that their investment in FDI incentive 
packages will be exceeded by the social benefits of FDI. Policy makers hope to attract 
knowledge by the way of FDI. In the early years after the fall of the USSR, FDI has 
been vital to create change within the economic systems of the former Eastern bloc 
countries by inducing much needed capital, generating cash revenues for empty 
government budgets and helping to restructure and upgrade industry and agriculture 
[Dunning 1991].  
Many of the hopes of governments lie in spillover effects. Although a company as such 
might not have any direct interest in spillover, positive spillover into the host economy 
will benefit the reputation of a foreign company, while negative spillovers might cause 
bad publicity and concern from local stakeholders, unions or NGOs [Meyer 2004:260]. 
Spillover was first introduces into the field of FDI in the 1960s [Blomström and Kokko 
2003:17] by a line of authors aiming to establish costs and benefits of FDI. Spillover is 
a term used in many spheres to describe the generation of qualities and the subsequent 
transfer into other sectors. Spillover effects, in the context of home country effects, are 
effects from the proximity of multinational enterprises that have invested abroad upon 
other local enterprises in the home country. In the context of host country effects of 
FDI, FDI spillovers measure how the presence of firms with foreign owners in the 
country affects other firms inside this host country. It can be cooncluded that spillovers 
in the home country take place when the MNEs cannot reap all the benefits that follow 
from making outward FDI abroad; some of these benefits "spill over" to the national 
firms in the home economy. [Vahter and Masso 2005:7-8]. 
In the case of FDI, it concerns mostly the spillover of knowledge and technology from 
foreign affiliates to the local host economy and domestic companies. When 
governments argue pro FDI, the benefits generated by the spillover effect are often the 
main argument. “It is assumed that the spillover effects are sufficiently large to justify 
investment incentives” [Blomström and Kokko 2003:9]. Spillover occurs mostly in the 
fields of knowledge and technology. As foreign firms enter a country, they will most 
likely to some extend bring with them knowledge and technology. It is hoped that by 
attracting FDI, the host country will gain this new technology and know how. However, 
results of spillover can be mixed. Research supports the theory that both host country 
and host industry strongly influence spillover incidence. Depending on methodology, 
researchers indicate efficiency gain as a result of technology spillover, while others 
conclude downright negative effects [Narula and Portelli 2004:6] Some studies have 
showed that spillover does not always occur, because local industries or manufacturers 
simply do not have the capability to extract the knowledge or compete with foreign 
companies. In cases with a weak or poor industry, there will also be no significant 
modern technology transfer. There is a risk that the foreign entity only imports second 
grade or inappropriate technology or that transfer does not occur or spread due to 
various factors [Sass 2003:5]. Import preferences vary depending on host country 
characteristics, and it is important to note that spillovers are not considered by the 
foreign firms in their value assessment [Blomström and Kokko 2003:3]. Furthermore, 
spillover effects are hard to quantify. Not all investments have the capability to create 
the same amount of spillover. The division into motives earlier presented is interesting 
in this perspective. Resource seeking activities provide fewer spillovers than market-
seeking investments, as they tend to be more capital intensive [Lall and Narula 2004:7]. 
Local market oriented firms have more interaction and therefore stronger positive 
impact than export oriented firms [Blomström and Kokko 2003:15]. It can also happen 
that the foreign companies will focus on a field of industry or production, where there is 
no competition or no prior experience in the host country with the result that little 
spillover can be expected [Ibid. 2003:14]. The closer the contact between foreign 
branches and local companies are, the more likely it is that spillover occurs. FDI 
benefits are not generated automatically [Sass 2003:3, Kathuria 1998]. The creation of 
linkages is vital and certain host country traits need to be in place. When all this is said, 
spillover does occur on a regular basis. “Foreign presence seems to have a significant 
positive impact on the rates of growth of local productivity” [Blomström and Kokko 
2003:12]. MNE in a host country can lead to spillovers of inward FDI to local 
enterprises. If foreign firms introduce new products and/or processes in their affiliates in 
a host country, domestic firms and other foreign owned firms may benefit from a faster 
diffusion of new technology. The diffusion comes through worker mobility between 
foreign owned and domestic firms, demonstration effects and through increased 
incentives to adopt state-of-the art technology in domestic firms, due to increased 
competition in the product market [Ibid. 2003]. Technological spillover may occur 
directly or indirectly. Directly via local subsidiaries of international firms or indirectly 
through transactions between host country firms and local subsidiaries [Sass 2003:5] 
Technological transfer is an important gain for the host economy as technology can be 
implemented in various fields ranging from change of export, import structure, 
infrastructure, R&D, improved productivity, changes in the human capital base [Ibid. 
2003:5].  
One form of spillover is intra-industry spillover. Via several channels, foreign presence 
in one sector can spill over into domestic firms around it. This can happen via transfer 
of employees that have been trained in the foreign affiliate and later decide to change to 
a domestic company or to set up their own business, bringing their knowledge with 
them as an asset. Also domestic companies that have prior been sceptic about new 
methods or designs can be inspired by foreign affiliates that bring with them new 
equipment or other ways of managing, distributing or selling goods. By seeing that it 
works for them domestic firms can decide to try new things and make new investments 
themselves [Meyer 2004:262]. Empirical data does, according to Meyer [2004:262-
263], not support the theory of positive intra-industry spillover, however he suggest that 
in the case of transition economies the environment might be more favourable in that 
prospect. 
In addition to technology transfer from the parent to its subsidiary, foreign subsidiaries 
themselves can be important sources for the transfer of technological knowledge and 
host market and foreign linkages related knowledge to the parent in the home country as 
well. This may occur, especially, if the affiliates are located in places with many 
innovative activities. [Vahter and Masso 2005:8]. Workers that will be trained in a 
foreign affiliate transfer knowledge later on to a local firms, for instance when the local 
companies become suppliers and hire workers previously trained in foreign affiliates. 
An important buzzword in spillover is the creation of linkages between foreign 
companies and local economies.  A host country’s size, technological capability of local 
firms, government policies and local content regulation influence the extend of linkages 
formed [Narula and Portelli 2004:9]. In general more linkages are generated, when 
communication between affiliate and parent company are costly, when the production 
process evolves the intensive utilisation of intermediate goods and when home and host 
country are not too different, when it comes to the terms of variety of intermediate 
goods produced [Ibid. 2004:8].  
 As mentioned previously, vertical FDI creates many linkages between a host countries 
domestic companies and the home country of the investor, therefore spillovers tend to 
be vertical rather than horizontal, as horizontal spillovers are simply the effects of FDI 
on other firms in the same sector (to the competitors)[Ibid. 2004:7]. Vertical linkages 
are created by the producer and customer surplus created by market transactions rather 
than by any externalities [Meyer 2004:264] and are especially important in generating 
technology spillovers [Narula and Portelli 2004:8]. 
Backward linkages can benefit the host economy and are generated between 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) and local suppliers integrated in the host economy 
[Ibid. 2004:8], although forward linkages are more likely to result in positive spillover 
[Sass 2003:10]. Forward linkages are created by downstream business. When domestic 
companies functioning as outlets for investors receive support by foreign companies 
perhaps as training or with the supply of machinery or goods this may increase 
productivity and improve sales per services [Meyer 2004:264].  
Apart from knowledge and technology spillover also the competition logically initiated 
from the appearance of foreign firms on the market, can be said to be classified as 
spillover. The competition forces, or motivates, local firms to invest in newer 
technology and work harder or faster in order to keep up. Again, spillover is only 
generated, if there are interactions between locals and foreign firms, and there is a 
geographical dimension of positive inter-industry spillover [Blomström and Kokko 
2003:12]. Domestic firms close to the foreign firms seem mainly to be affected by the 
positive impact of FDI. Should the foreign firms choose to focus on niche activities 
spillover will be small due to lack of interaction. It is also true that competition has the 
risk that local firms might be pressed out of market and end up in market segments of 
no interest to foreign firms [Blomström and Kokko 2003:14], but competition in general 
is proved to be favourable for generating spillover [Blomström and Kokko 2003:15].   
 
Table 1. Spillover gains and preconditions 
Expected gains from 
spillover 
Necessary preconditions for 
spillover 
Technology Transfer Liberal business environment 
Knowledge Transfer Updated industry 
Competitive environment Well educated labour force 
Creating work places Well-functioning institutions 
Capital  
Source: Composed by author 
 
As stressed earlier spillover is NOT an automatic consequence, there are a number of 
necessary preconditions for spillover to occur affected by multiple host country and host 
industry factors. Whether a country’s industry is able to benefit depends on the 
countries absorption capacity. Integration of FDI into host economy is an important 
focus area [Sass 2003:3] and the host countries capacity to absorb the spillover is vital 
for development.  One could define absorption capacity, as the capability within a host 
country to accumulate, absorb and benefit from technology and know-how transferred 
to it via linkages with foreign affiliates operating within the economy [Narula and 
Portelli 2004:10]. Research has shown that host country characteristics are alpha omega 
for their ability to absorb and benefit from spillover effects generated by FDI inflow. A 
host country with a highly competitive environment, high educational level of labour 
force and with fewer formal requirements on the affiliates operation [Kokko and 
Blomström 199] will be awarded higher benefits. 
One could imagine a scenario, where a weak country with a weak local industry 
suddenly is swamped by foreign affiliates simply due to the lack of competitive 
environment; in that case, the locals will be taken out of the game altogether without 
any gain. Ability and motivation among local firms are vital, they need to engage with 
foreign affiliates in order to absorb skills and knowledge [Blomström and Kokko 
2003:16]. Low competition and high technology gab can prevent positive spillovers to 
emerge [Narula and Portelli 2004:11]. “Weak technological capability may be an 
obstacle for spillover” [Blomström and Kokko 2003:14] as the host country has no 
prior experience and training in dealing with, or spreading, the technology in question. 
An exhausting examination by Blomström et al in 1994 concludes that spillovers are 
concentrated to middle-income countries, which is again linked to the question of 
absorption capacity. These findings are supported by Balasubramanyan in 1998, who 
concludes that FDI needs a certain level of well-developed infrastructure, stable 
economic climate and human capital in order to be favourable to development 
[Blomström and Kokko 2003:16]. Narula and Dunning [2000] agree with that in their 
findings and add the necessity of well-defined institutional milieu. Each part is 
necessary and belongs at different stages of development with different costs and 
benefits. The main point being that investing into these components at the right stages 
will result in a multiplier effect for the host economy [Lall and Narula 2004:12]. 
 
1.4. Layers of Foreign Direct Investment Policy Framework  
 
The main indicators necessary to attract FDI involve a complicated mix of economic 
factors, policy framework and business motives. In the competition to attract FDI there 
are several layers. Figure 2 attempts to illustrate these layers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Layers of Policy Framework  
Source: Composed by author 
 
At the centre, there is a core, which consists of policies focused on entry and operation of 
the foreign investors such as regulating which rights they have and what standards of 
treatment they may receive, as well as policies controlling the functioning of the market 
as such. Supplementary core policies may be those of trade and privatisation, as they 
influence, directly and sometimes indirectly, the effectiveness of the other FDI policies 
[UNCTAD 1998].  
The following layer is formed by national policies aimed at liberalising the FDI framework such as monetary, fiscal and exchange 
rate policies, while an outer ring of policies is aimed at attaining a favourable investment climate and promote FDI inflow and 
therefore balances on a macroeconomic level [UNCTAD 1998:97-99]. The outer ring entails an intricate mix of policies covering 
areas such as industrial innovation, technology and regional development and labour market. Finally surrounding all policies and 
policy decisions is the actual macroeconomic environment of the host country. 
The contents of these layers differ from nation to nation depending on development level and priority areas of the government. The 
cores of the framework have in time become rather similar due to globalisation and regional co-operation, therefore the rings 
become increasingly important in order to differentiate and attract FDI. The boundaries between the layers are also becoming 
increasingly blurry as investors demand more of policy framework. 
.  
In order to attract FDI governments make the use of certain instruments in policy-
making, those instruments can be divided into two distinct groups as defined by Oman 
[2000]: incentives and rule-based instruments. The terms incentives cover the fiscal and 
financial policies –which both belong to the inner ring of policies, while rule-based 
Core policies: a wide range of 
policies dealing with entry and 
operation of the foreign investor, as 
well as trade and privatisation. 
Outer ring policies: Macroeconomic 
policies such as industrial innovation, 
technology and regional development, 
labour market 
Inner ring policies: monetary, 
fiscal and exchange rate policies 
Host country 
macroeconomic 
environment 
instruments include a broader range of government instruments from the formation of 
inter-regional cooperation’s, the set-up of economic zones or labour policies and belong 
at large to the outer ring. In the next chapter, those instruments will be presented. 
  
Incentive-based instruments 
The legal, political and economic stability of a country, potential growth, labour skills, its geographical location, production costs, 
its relative factor endowment and its size are the main factors looked upon by foreign investors when deciding where to invest 
[Antalocy and Sass 2001:8-9]. Although it has been much discussed, as of the later years there seems to have been formed a general 
consensus among scholars that FDI incentive schemes help determine, how attractive a country or a region may perform in 
attracting foreign investing. When companies look to invest into a quite similar region, the incentive package may form a more very 
important factor, when picking the final location [Antalocy and Sass 2001:9]. Theory suggests that incentive schemes are highly 
effective in cases where countries wish to distinguish themselves from neighbouring countries or regions. In scenarios where the 
business climate is already favourable and where the incentives come early and with an amount of certainty in the investment 
project’s life circle [Bergman 2000]. With the liberalisation of the legal framework concerning FDI in Central and Eastern Europe, 
the incentive schemes have raised their importance there also. 
For the host country to benefit from the FDI and to continuously increase the annual inflow, the economic policies will continue to 
be extremely important in a world that becomes more global and similar [Sass 2003:4]. Financial and fiscal policies are important, 
when focusing upon a country’s economic stability. Among the macroeconomic policies they are the most important, as they effect 
investment types and decisions [Antalocy and Sass 2001:8]. To attract the foreign direct investment, the governments make use of a 
wide array of instruments giving the foreign companies certain advantages. “Incentives are any measurable economic advantage 
afforded specific enterprises or categories of enterprises (or at the direction of) a government, in order to encourage them to behave 
in a certain manner”  [UNCTAD 1996]. Incentives are provided by governments and their, as well as local municipalities [Antalocy 
and Sass 2001:9]. At large one can divide those instruments into three main categories: monetary, fiscal (incentive based) and other 
incentives (rules based). Incentives of both fiscal and financial origin can be granted to foreign investors both at discretion or 
automatically and with or without certain conditions tied to them [Oman 2000:21]. The conditions can both be, as will be shown in 
the analytical part of the paper, attached to size of investment, region, length or performance requirements. The table below gives a 
short overview of the main incentives in all three categories. 
 
Table 2. Specific Policy Tools for Attracting Foreign Direct Investments 
Financial  Fiscal Rule-based 
• Subsidies 
• Partial state ownership 
• Credit guarantees 
• Support of personal 
training or retraining 
• Export guarantees 
• Soft loans 
• Insurance and credit 
• Tax exemption 
• VAT exemption 
• Tax deduction 
• Lowering of import tariffs 
• Reinvestment allowances 
• Tax rebate 
• Tax credit 
• Import duties 
• Lower tax rates 
• Elimination / lowering of 
import tariffs 
• Social security benefits 
paid by state 
• Monopoly power 
• Lower price on input 
• Free or reduced real 
estate 
• Preferential treatment 
• Custom free areas 
• Special economic 
zones 
• Industrial parks 
• Promotion 
• Free land access 
• Special conditions in 
tenders 
Source: Compiled by author based on UNCTAD 1996, Sass 2003, Antalocy and Sass 2001 and 
Blomström and Kokko 2003 
 
According to theory, the most used instrument in developing and transition economies 
are fiscal incentives, therefore they will also be the primary focus for the following 
comparison of case country incentive policies [UNCTAD 2000]. The reason for their 
popularity among developing countries, lies within the fact that they do not have to be 
directly financed by public funds, which in turn in these countries is likely to be scarce 
[Blomström and Kokko 2003:5]. Although abolishment of import duties creates a loss 
of fiscal revenues, it can also attract FDI [Antaloczy and Sass 2001:16]. The most 
applied fiscal policies include reductions of the base income tax rate, tax holidays, 
exemptions from import duties or duty drawbacks, deduction of promotional and 
advertisement costs, capital based incentives and the possibility to carry forward losses, 
accelerated depreciation allowances, investment and re-investment allowances, as well 
as specific deduction from gross earnings for income tax-purposes or deductions from 
social security contributions [Oman 2000:20-23 and Antalocy and Sass 2001:9]. The 
majority of these aim at reducing the tax burden of foreign investors. According to 
empirical evidence, the general level of taxes is vital when attracting foreign FDI, since 
a lower level of tax usually will result in a higher level of profit for the company 
[Antalocy and Sass 2001:8].  As mentioned accelerated write-offs are another tool 
relevant for transition economies, as it reduces the expenses for investors, while 
encourages them to invest in new equipment, machinery and buildings. 
Reduced taxes or charges on the wage bill are rarely applied in transition economies, as 
the tax level is already kind to foreign investors [Antaloczy and Sass 2001:16]. 
However smaller countries, or countries otherwise not that attractive, can gain on 
diminishing tax rates according to empirical evidence from Clark [Clark 2000]. 
There is a danger however in diminishing the expenses and tax burden of the foreign 
investor, as footloose companies may be attracted by tax holidays, but may very well 
leave again once the tax holidays expires. Tax holidays have little effect on spillover, 
however combined with certain political elements backward and forward linkages can 
be enhanced [Antaloczy and Sass 2001:15] with the gain of turning the footloose into a 
steady investor or make them transfer additional or other activities to the host economy. 
While tax holidays may attract new investments good write-offs, tax allowances and 
lower tax rates for reinvested earnings help please investors already present [Antaloczy 
and Sass 2001:15].  
   
 
While fiscal incentives are most popular in developing countries, financial incentives 
are the preferred tool of choice in developed countries [UNCTAD 2000]. In developed 
countries the amount of financial incentive per project or job created is generally much 
higher than in other regions [Antaloczy and Sass 2001:16]. As well as fiscal incentives, 
financial incentives are applied by governments in an attempt to divert FDI to certain 
sectors. Where fiscal policies aim at reducing the tax burden, financial aim at providing 
direct financial support in an attempt to reduce the overall costs of investing.  
The most important financial incentives are grants; also widely used are subsidiary 
loans and loan guarantees, access to subsidised loans, operational costs deduction for 
the foreign company or defray capital. These incentives are frequently targeted, at least 
nominally at specific purposes such as grants for labour training, wage subsidies, 
donations of land and/or site facilities [Oman 2000:20-23]. 
 
 
Rule-based, or outer-ring, policies are a much broader and heterogeneous group of 
policy instruments. They range from inter-regional cooperation, economic zones over 
investment agencies to labour market policies. Rules-based instruments cover incentives, 
which cannot be included into financial or fiscal group. The main aims of the other 
incentives are by non-financial means to increase the profitability of the foreign 
investment. Instruments may fall into various policy areas by providing infrastructure, 
subsidising prices for services or increasing market share. The later may be done by 
preferential treatment or the granting of monopoly rights [Antalocy and Sass 2001:9]. In 
this case structural and market policies are equally important, as are educational, training 
and health policies. They all influence the state of R&D in a country, its labour force, 
infrastructure, industrial structure and composition of economic units [Ibid. 2001:8-9]. 
This is all necessary on various levels, when it comes to attracting, and just as 
importantly absorbing, FDI and the benefits it brings to a host country. These mentioned 
tools can be used for more than simply attracting FDI, they also act in a certain extend as 
structural policy tools to name an example. This happens as the aim moves from simply 
attracting to attracting FDI into a certain industry [Ibid. 2001:17]. Alternatively, regional 
development is attempted advanced by offering cheap land or special zones to move to 
certain rural areas or areas of high unemployment turning it into, in the last case, a 
labour market tool. 
 
FDI policy expands when new needs arise –when an economy only attracts footloose investors, quick to move again, creating 
linkages with the investor and the host economy become the new goal thus expanding the extend of tools and policies connected 
with FDI inflow. 
The spillover effects policy makers hope to generate from FDI inflow are as 
mentioned not generated automatically. However, there is a possibility to further it 
by attaching performance requirements (PR) and conditions to the incentive 
schemes. PR’s include export requirements, the requirement of domestic 
participation, local benefit requirements, technology transfer requirements, R&D 
requirements, and employment-related requirements. It most be noted that 
multilateral and regional conventions impose certain restrictions on the use of such 
clauses [Sass 2003:11]. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
2. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INVESTMENT 
ENVIRONMENT AND INCENTIVE POLICIES IN CASE 
COUNTRIES 
 
2.1. Common characteristics of Central and Eastern European 
Transition Countries 
 
Central and Eastern Europe attracts high inflows of FDI. It is considered the second 
most attractive investment area in a global perspective, only topped by Western Europe 
[Hoof 2006]. Improvements in stability and law framework influence the inflow rather 
quickly in this region, so frequent changes in policy framework occur regularly.  
Prior to World War one and the Russian revolution, only Russia attracted noticeable 
FDI in the region due to its natural resources, however with the rise of the Bolsheviks 
and especially with Stalin’s rise to power, this came to an end. Foreign capital and 
investors with their capitalistic instincts were incompatible with the idealistic idea of the 
Soviet Union, which became a closed area, until Gorbachev’s reforms in the late 1980s 
[Meyer and Pind 1998:6-8]. Bureaucracy and crime continued to be the mark of many 
of the former communist states until the turn of the millennium, and still today continue 
to make hindrances for the free flow of FDI.  
Empirical data suggest that the starting point for major investments into the transition 
economies was 1995 [Ibid. 1998:15], and since than the growth has continued at rocket 
speed. As the table below shows, the average growth rate for FDI stock in the world, as 
well as developed and developing countries, since 1995, has been around three times, 
while for the combined CEE countries the amount of inward FDI stock has grown by 
11,89 times in just one decade. The amazing growth rate of the CEE becomes even 
clearer, when comparing the inward stock in 2005 with the figures from 1990, where 
the inward stock for the CEE has grown more than 166 times. That is more than 32 
times the world rate. 
 
Table 3. Inward stock of FDI, millions of USD 
Region 1990 1995 2000 2003 2005 Growth 
1990/2005 
Growth 
1995/2005 
World total 1,950,303 2,992,068 6,089,884 8,245,074 10,129,739 5,19 3,39 
Developed 
countries 
1,399,509 2,035,799 4,011,686 5,701,633 7,117,110 5,09 3,5 
Developing 
countries 
547,965 916,697 1,939,926 2,280,171 2,756,992 5,03 3 
CEE 2,828 39,573 138,271 263,270 470,689 166,44 11,89 
Source: Compiled by author based on UNCTAD 2004 and author’s own calculations 
 
 
While 1995 was the starting point for major FDI inflow into the region, 1997 was the 
first year Eastern Europe as a whole registered a positive GDP growth rate (see Table 
14 for case country GDP growth rate).  
The inflow of FDI has since the very beginning been concentrated heavily in certain 
countries [Kekic 2005]. Hungary quickly became one of the leaders on the level of the 
Asian tigers Malaysia and Singapore. Currently the share of Hungary in the overall CEE 
inward FDI stock is 13% [UNCTAD database]. Estonia was right behind Hungary in 
attracting FDI (looking at per capita) and currently has a share of CEE inward stack 
totalling 2,6 % [UNCTAD database]. Moldova’s FDI stock, although in growth, only 
totals 0,2% of total CEE inward FDI stock [UNCTAD database]. 
The Baltic countries have all been very successful. Many attribute the success to their 
small size and reform-friendly governments, combined with their close proximity and 
ties to the Northern region.  
In general, flows into the entire post-communist region have for a long time been 
dominated by inflows into the natural resource sector [Kekic 2005]. However focusing 
on the CEE, not taking into account the oil rich former states Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan further east, the largest inflow of FDI is into the financial sector, as 
well as into logistics and distribution. The largest investor into the region overall 
continues to be the USA, with Germany as the second largest contributor [LocoMonitor 
2007]. 
When early on investors were asked about their interests in the post-communist sphere, 
the answers were often that the long-term potential was attracting and the first mover 
potential alluring [Meyer and Pind:29], despite the high risk connected with doing 
business in an unstable environment. 
 
According to Varblane [2000:4-5] the development of government policies in the CEE 
after WWII can be divided into three periods. The first of these ranging 1945 to mid 
1950, the second from mid 1950s to the end of the 1970s, and the final one taking its 
beginning in the early 1980s. 
In the first period the outflows of FDI came mainly from the US, and the developing 
countries governments were relatively indifferent. Than came a period of growing 
protectionist approach and restrictions. This affected not only FDI, but also foreign 
trade. The buzzword of the time embedded in government concern was “import 
substituting industrialization”. Since the 80s, this buzzword was replaces by the new 
“liberalisation”. Governments have continued to liberalise their FDI frameworks ever 
since with the result of a boom in FDI stock [UNCTAD 1998:94]. 
In general, there are three main aims of the liberal FDI policies. The first being reducing 
restrictions, which aims at removing objects that distort the free flow of the market by 
applying specific restrictions to foreign investors such as instance tariffs, but also 
regarding incentives and subsidies. This is now a rule for most countries, although a few 
sectors of strategic importance remain protected [Varblane 2000:5]. In Central and 
Eastern Europe the privatisation policies have dealt with this removal of restrictions in 
great deal. Another aim is the strengthening of positive standards of treatment of foreign 
investors. This is reflected by countless bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements 
signed dealing specifically with the protection and treatment of FDI. This was especially 
the case in the beginning of the 90s, as transitional countries emerged onto the scene of 
world economy. The third aim of liberal FDI policies is the strengthening of market 
controls [UNCTAD 1998:94]. This happens to ensure that the competitive environment 
is functioning properly. This is ensured by making agreements and laws on disclosure of 
information, prudential supervision as well as competition rules. Since 1980 the number 
of countries with competition laws has increased to 70 from 40 [UNCTAD 1997a]. In 
the beginning of the new millennium, several post-communist countries joined the EU 
with the benefits that follow such as political stability, structural reform and upgrade of 
infrastructure and skills [Kekic 2005]. One should not underestimate the benefits of 
accession in term of EU structural reforms and closer proximity to the EU core [Ibid.], 
which will make the countries seem more attractive to investors.  
 
 
Privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe 
Privatisation has been a major tool in all CEE countries in term of creating basis for FDI 
inflow, however the methods of privatisation has varied greatly throughout the region.  
The most common method of privatising large firms worldwide is stock market 
flotation i.e. the general population would be invited to buy shares in an “initial public 
offering “(IPO). This however was not feasible in the transition context, because IPO’s 
require developed stock markets, where the capital can be raised. In CEE, investible 
financial assets were small, and stock market regulatory institution, and stock markets 
in general, not present. Most crucially potential investors lacked detailed info on state-
owned firms. Instead voucher privatisation was developed, the basic idea being that all 
citizens receive a voucher, which they can use to require shares in firms. This was 
implemented widely across CEE, and many countries used voucher privatisation as a 
main pillar of their privatisation process except for Hungary [Meyer 2003]. 
Table 4 gives an overview of methods of privatisation, distinguishing to whom the 
companies were transferred. 
 
Table 4. How to privatise and to who?  
 To the general 
population 
To current 
managers 
and/or 
workers 
To previous 
owners 
To outside investors, such as 
foreign or domestic private 
firms 
By sale Stock market 
flotation: from 
mid 1990’s 
only 
MDO, MEBO: 
e.g. Poland and 
Romania 
 Auction: 
Everywhere for 
small business 
Negotiated 
sale, tender: 
Estonia 
and 
Hungary 
By free 
distribution 
Voucher 
privatisation: 
Most countries 
 Restitution: 
Bulgaria and 
East 
Germany 
 
Source: Meyer (2003) 
 
Hungary and Estonia alike did not choose common voucher as their main privatisation method, 
but decided on setting the former state-owned companies up for sale, thus making it easier for 
foreign investors to gain access and participate [Varblane 2003a]. They chose to give equal 
access to all participants domestic and foreign alike. The sales were carried out under the 
condition that the buyer would create of a certain number of jobs and investments over a 
designated period. In Estonia, this resulted in long-term reconstruction programs initiated by the 
foreign investors in order to raise efficiency. One of the main questions in Estonia, requiring 
legal solutions, in the beginning of the 1990’s, was creating a legal basis for the privatisation of 
state property [Varul 2001]. Although the Privatisation Act in Estonia was first adopted in 1993, 
the process of privatisation started even before that [Estonian Institute 2003]. Estonia followed 
an intensive programme of privatisation in the years 1993-1996. 17% of FDI inflow in the 
beginning was indirectly, or directly, linked to privatisation [Hunya 2004:103]. Despite the 
mistrust in the success of the program from outsiders currently, only 15 years later, more than 90 
% of the Estonia’s industrial and manufacturing enterprises have been privatised [Nellis]. In 
Estonia in the beginning of 2000 performance requirements in the context of privatisation were 
applied for domestic and foreign actors alike. All actors are exempt from state taxes and fees 
[Bergman 2000:11]. The gain from privatisation is normally in the form of reinvested earnings, 
which in Estonia in 2001 contributed to 41% of total FDI [Hunya 2004:95]. 
When companies in Romania were privatised, the government offered reduced debts of 
those enterprises, in some cases deleting all of the accumulated debt. In 2002, a new 
privatisation law was launched in Romania, which initiated financial relief in an 
organized way, in order to help the sale of the rest of the public sector run more 
smoothly [Ibid. 2002]. Also in Moldova, there have been several privatisation stages. 
The first program was approved and initiated in 1993-94 and included the launch of a 
Ministry of Privatisation. In 1995-1997 mass privatisation for National Patrimonial 
Bonds followed, together with distribution of the agricultural farms property and land, 
housing privatisation and sale of state property. 50 % of the shares of the agricultural 
products processing enterprises were given to agricultural enterprises-suppliers of raw 
materials [NAAI]. The latest stage has run 1997-1998, which was prolonged until 2000, 
consisted mainly of sale of public property, and extending the areas in which 
privatisation took place. Currently 2235 enterprises have been totally or partially 
privatised using a mix of privatisation initiatives. 60% of the industrial production in 
Moldova is controlled by the private sector [Ibid.]. 
Other methods of privatisation across the CEE entail management-buy-out and 
management-employee-buy-out. The later was the second most important method in 
Hungary. In Estonia the second most important method was the voucher privatisation 
model. Finally, also many countries considered restitution to former owners, which has 
been a lengthy and complicated process [Meyer 2003: 33-35]. 
 
Other players in Foreign Direct Investment policy making  
Although host policy makers are still the most important players in designing incentive and related policies, more players have taken 
the scene in the later years following the growing europeanisation and globalisation trends. The role of regional cooperation cannot 
be underestimated, and neither can regional competition. Both colour many policy decisions and may sometimes not have the most 
beneficial outcome [Oman 2000]. If one country aims at competing, the neighbouring nations may find it hard to stay out of the 
bidding race.Furthermore multilateral agreements touch upon incentives and investment rules, their coverage is still limited, but 
their influence is definitely not. 2495 bilateral treaties were in place by the end of 2005, along with 2750 double taxation treaties and 
232 other international agreements influencing investment provisions [UNCTAD 2006:9]. In total 176 countries have signed 
bilateral treaties, which cover a total of 7% of global FDI stock and 22% of FDI in developing countries [Varblane 2000]. In the 
CEE countries 57% of FDI is covered by agreements signed in bilateral investment treaties [Varblane 2000]. 
Both the WTO and the OECD have tried to push for more comprehensive legislation, but till now the most comprehensive 
regulations concerning FDI are found within the NAFTA and the EU [Blomström and Kokko 2003:18]. Incentive policies have been 
necessary within the EU due to the extensive market integration and comprehensive subsidising. EU is probably the most important 
policy player among the CEE states, as many countries are members. In addition, three out of four of the case countries in this study 
are member states, however EU influences all of them. This influence began even before the membership. The competition to 
become an EU member state has had a great impact on the CEE countries in respect to their institution building and policy design. 
Potential members-states upon applying accept that the EU requires substantial changes in domestic policy in order for the states to 
confirm to the acquis communitaire. Often the allure of potential membership is said to boost modernisation of economic, social and 
political systems. Romania upon becoming a candidate country spend its pre-accession assistance on modernisation of infrastructure 
and heightening of ecological standards [Spendzharova 2003 :152]. Corruption is also targeted hard from the EU’s side. However, 
studies focus on the broad overall trends instead of on the effect of specific policies, making it hard to say anything on the specific 
impact of the EU on policies affecting FDI.  Nevertheless, EU membership and the road towards it undoubtedly influence FDI 
policies. For instance Hungary had to restructure its policies in connection with Free Zones that until membership were unique and 
very liberal. Now with the new policies Hungary has been allowed to keep the free zones, as a regional policy instrument [Hunya 
2004:113]. Estonia has in turn had to apply the EU regime of export and import duties to third countries, where before there were 
virtually no export and import duties in place.  
The old member states have voiced concern about the apparent tax competition from new member states, and suggestions of 
harmonisation of tax rates, either strictly or within a range, have been proposed. These suggestions are however still on an 
imaginative level, although this could change in the future, if FDI inflow is too strongly redirected from the west to the east 
[Lahrèche-Révil 2006:52]. In turn this would mean an even stronger impact on policy frameworks. 
On FDI itself, scholars have concluded that the announcement of a country becoming an 
EU accession country efficiently increases the positive expectations to that country and 
boosts FDI inflow [Bevan et al. 2001:3]. On the negative side this effect does widened 
the gap to potential neighbouring states that do not enjoy the same status, thus creating a 
regional gap [Ibid. 2001:9]. One example can be found right here among the case 
country, where the gap between the new member state Romania and its poor neighbour 
Moldova is widening. Another issue regarding EU accession is that becoming a 
candidate country gives stability, but at the same time requires many policy changes, 
which creates instability and risk due to changing environment, both are not appreciated 
in investor circles. In addition, membership normally means an increase in wages, which 
lead Meyer et al. [2005] to conclude that businesses may very well prefer imperfect 
institutional framework to frequent and unpredictable changing framework, even if the 
changes are in their favour [Meyer et al. 2005:10]. 
 
 
2.2. Comparative Analysis of Broad Policy Approach of Foreign 
Direct Investments 
 
Since gaining independence in 1991, all case country governments have been 
determinedly pro open market economy. However, the roads travelled in order to get 
there have been different. In Estonia, the transformation was based on the concept of 
shock therapy and rapid radical market reforms. The main policies, established by the 
Estonian government in order to attract FDI, were aimed at stabilizing, privatising and 
liberalizing. Among the cornerstones were structural reforms, investing in infrastructure 
and creating transparent administrative procedures. The main aim being establishing an 
environment suited for business [Hunya 2004:106-107]. Policy wise Estonia has the 
most reduced form of investment incentive system and leads a policy considered 
beneficial to spillover. Privatisation was a major tool and a natural way of integrating 
neighbouring countries and FDI investors into the Estonian economy [Berghäll 1999:9]. 
The main strategy of the Hungarian incentive policy is trying to divert FDI flow into 
selected locations, sectors and activities [UNCTAD 2006:84].  Romanian policy makers 
have been progressive with restructuation of the banking sector and installing a fairly 
liberal trade policy. In the later years liberalization of capital restrictions and 
improvement of legal system and public administration have been among the focus 
areas [Euler Hermes France 2007]. Many of the changes have been fuelled by the wish 
to join the EU as quickly as possible and have been so successfully implemented that 
the World Bank in 2006 labelled Romania the world's second-fastest economic reformer 
that year. The Moldavian policy makers have lately been focusing on privatisation and 
the boosting of FDI inflow, as well as modernising infrastructure in order to attract FDI 
to the country. 
Prior to the main analysis of the broad investment environment, here will be an 
introduction to the main sectors and investors in the case countries, which currently play 
a prominent role. The table below shows top investors by country.  
Table 5. Top investors by Country 2006 
Estonia Hungary Moldova Romania  
Sweden Germany Russia Netherlands 
Finland Netherlands USA Austria 
UK Austria Spain France 
Netherlands USA UK Germany 
In
v
es
to
rs
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
Norway Luxemburg / France Germany Italy 
Source: Compiled by author based on UNCTAD database, EIA, Larive Romania and ITD 
 
Estonia is a textbook example of the importance of geographical and cultural proximity. 
Three quarters of Estonia’s inflow of FDI stems from the capital-rich Scandinavian 
countries. Many larger firms from the Nordic countries have established their 
headquarters for Baltic activities in Estonia [Hunya 2004:96]. Germany is one of the 
main investors in Hungary, Moldova and Romania, but only in Moldova, do we find 
Russia among the main investors. In Hungary German investors cover approximately 
20% of investments, the same for the Netherlands in Romania and Finland in Estonia. 
However, the biggest investor in Estonia is Sweden with more than 50%. 
As can be seen in Table 6, the case countries attract a FDI inflow into a wide variety of 
sectors. In Estonia Sweden has been extremely active in the financial and telecom-
sector, which together with the manufacturing is mainly foreign owned [Ibid. 2004:93]. 
In Hungary electronics, automotive components and machinery and equipment make up 
the main investor sectors, and only in Romania is agriculture and industry among the 
top 5 sectors. The Dutch investors in Romania are mainly centred on banking, insurance 
and retail. The Austrian, whose share of total inflow is around 14%, have bought the 
largest bank. The largest other investments are found in wood processing, construction 
and real estate [Larive Romania]. To find substantial investors into Romanian 
agriculture, one has to turn to Italy. 
 
Table 6. Top sectors by investments 
Estonia Hungary Moldova Romania  
Finance Electronics Electric, energy, gas 
and water supply 
Agriculture 
Real estate, renting and 
business 
Automotive 
components 
Manufacturing Industry Industry 
Manufacturing Machinery and 
Equipments 
Trade Construction 
Other communities  Other transport services Transport Retail and 
Wholesale 
 Se
ct
o
rs
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
Wholesale and retail 
trade 
Business services Hotels and Restaurants Tourism 
 Source: Compiled by author based on Eurostat, EBRD and EIA 
 
 In the following sections the broad investment environment in the case countries will be analysed using the eight indicators market size, labour 
force, infrastructure, stability and growth, corruption, freedom, ease of doing business and competitiveness and innovation. These indicators are 
chosen to establish the locational advantages of the case countries. After analysing each indicator, the case country will receive points from one 
to four. One indicating the best investment environment and four the worst. In the cases where more than one ranking or table is included in the 
evaluation, a combined ranking will be indicated. After the indicators are ranked, they will be combined in order to evaluate the absorption 
capacity of the case countries, and afterwards in combination with FDI per capita to determine, whether the theoretical approach to investment 
environment can be applied to the actual reality. 
 
 
Market size: In terms of attractiveness and locational advantages market size has 
always been deemed important. Although regional cooperation and decreasing 
internationalisation has made size of less importance, it remains an important first 
indicator. Looking at the case countries presented in Table 7 Romania is clearly the 
largest both in population, which equals possible consumers and labour force, and in 
area.  
 
Table 7. Market Size 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EBRD.         
 
In the opposite end of the scale one finds Estonia, which is more than 5 times smaller 
area-wise and has a 15,5 times smaller population. Even Moldova, although smaller in 
area, boosts of three times the population of Estonia. Hungary’s population is less than 
half that of Romania. However Hungary is the second largest country of the four case 
countries in terms of both area as well as population. 
 
Labour Force: The allure of well-educated, low cost labour has been a motivating 
factor for many investors, when relocating or outsourcing to CEE, however now many 
voice the concern that the pool is drying out. In both Hungary and Estonia, the shortage 
of cheap labour is beginning to be a constraint. Executives are still available, but the 
number of blue-collar workers is becoming scarcer.  Larger labour mobility and the 
failure to reform the educational system as quickly to as the economic system has put 
constraints on executives as well [Meyer et al. 2005:8, Varblane 2000:17]. In Romania 
lack of labour force this is yet a problem. Romania still has a well-educated labour force 
mainly centred on the service, technology, IT and engineering 
[PriceWaterHouseCoopers 2006]. Nevertheless, with higher mobility the problem could 
very well soon arise. In Moldova 30% of the work force is estimated to have left the 
country to find work, most of which are assumed to be leaving for neighbouring state 
Romania [National Bureau of statistics of the Republic of Moldova]. Calculations in 
Estonia suggest that around 3,000-4,000 will immigrate a year, however the prognoses 
concludes that most of immigrants only leave temporarily [Chandler et al. 2003:33]. 
Another debated issue connected to labour forces is low productivity [Hunya 2004:104-
105]. However despite a rather substantial productivity gap between domestic and 
 Population 
(in millions) 
Area 
(‘000 sq.km.) 
IE 
Estonia 
 
1.4 45 4 
Hungary 10 93 2 
Romania 21.7 238 1 
Moldova 4,2 33.8 
 
3 
foreign companies, it is important to remember that foreign capital is situated mostly in 
capital intensive sectors, while domestic firms make up the largest share of labour-
intensive technology sectors [Ibid. 2004:111]. On top of scarcity of labour force, the 
inflow of foreign investments has inflated the salary scale, especially in manufacturing, 
the salaries still remain well below EU average, as can be seen in the table below. The 
lowest average salary is found in Moldova and the highest in Hungary. The largest 
difference between minimum salary and average salary is found in Estonia, where there 
is a total of EUR 441 mark between the minimum and the average salary. 
 
Table 8. Monthly salary 2006 (EUR) 
 Estonia Hungary Romania Moldova EU 
Minimum salary 159 247 90 na 572,5 
Average salary  600 632.8 434 108 1700 
Source: Compiled by author based on UNCTAD database, EIA, ARIS, Eurostat  
and the National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova 
 
As empirical research has shown that a country with high unemployment is more likely 
to attract investors, the CEE countries have potential in that area [Barros and Cabral 
2000]. The unemployment rates within them skyrocketed in the beginning of the 90s in 
the wake of structural reforms and privatisation schemes, but they have all climbed 
below 10% in the first decade of the new millennium, as can be seen below in Table 9. 
Moldova remains the country with the highest unemployment rate (nothing indicates 
that the 2004 rate should have decreased substantially). Estonia has the lowest 
unemployment rate at 5,9 %, but it is clear that the rates fluctuate rather much. 
 
 
Table 9. Unemployment in percentage of labour force 
 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
Estonia 9,2 12,8 9,5 9,2 5,9 
Hungary 8,4 6,4 5,8 6,1 7,5 
Romania 5,4 7,2 8,4 8,1 7,4 
Moldova 10,1 8,5 6,8 8,0 na 
Source: Compiled by author based on Eurostat and the National  
Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova 
 
Education of labour force is another important indicator (See Table 10). In the clear lead 
on the educational level is Estonia with the highest percentage of students in tertiary 
education, as well as the highest amount of foreign languages learned by pupils. 
Furthermore almost 90% of the total Estonian population have completed upper 
secondary education. In Moldova almost half as many students are enrolled in tertiary 
education, while Hungary has the lowest amount of foreign languages learnt by pupils.  
 
Table 10. Education 2005 
 Students in 
tertiary education4 
Foreign languages 
learnt by pupils 
Total population having 
completed upper 
secondary education % 
IE 
combined 
Estonia 4,74 2 89,1 3 
Hungary 3,85 1 76,5 3 
Romania 2,94 1,9 73,1 3 
Moldova 2,7 1,05 na 
 
1 
Source: Compiled by author based on EBRD, Eurostat, and National Bureau of Statistics of the 
Republic of Moldova 
 
The IE scale for labour force is calculated based on the assumption that high level of 
education, compelled with low salary and higher unemployment (from the assumption 
that the registered unemployed would be available for labour and the empirical 
conclusion that countries with high unemployment attract most investors, as indicated 
earlier) should result in the best rank. 
 
Infrastructure: Infrastructure has by almost all scholars been deemed one of the most 
important components of a successful FDI policy. Infrastructure is vital for setting up a 
business with regard to both communication and transport. The EBRD index of 
structural reform uses various indicators to evaluate the changes in transition 
economies. Hungary has been the most successful reformer in this regard scoring top 
point for railways, telecom and water and wastewater reforms. Romania and Estonia 
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 % of total population 
both score 3,3 out of 4+ in their structural reforms, while Moldova yet again lags behind 
with 2,3 points. Table 11 shows all points combined. 
 
Table 11. Indicators of structural reforms concerning infrastructure in case countries5 
 
 
EBRD 
index of 
structural 
reform 
Electric 
power 
Railways Roads Telecom Water 
and 
waste 
water 
Global 
technology 
ranking 
EI 
Estonia 3,3 3,3 4+ 2,3 4 4 20 2 
Hungary 3,7 4 3,3 3,7 4 4 33 1 
Romania 3,3 3,3 4 3 3,3 3,3 55 3 
Moldova 2,3 3 2 2 3 2 92 
 
4 
Source: Compiled by author based on EBRD, World Economic Forum 
 
Stability and Growth: Moldova is often talked about as the poorest country in Europe. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union has left the country literally in pieces and plagued by 
instability both politically and economically. After the breakdown of the USSR, many 
years of decline and instability both economically and politically followed also in 
Romania, but since the turn of the millennium major reforms has lead to relative stability 
and major growth. Estonia’s main stability issues are connected to political risk. 
Changing governments and the geographically close location to Russia, to which the 
relationship rides like a roller coaster, makes Estonia high ranked on the political risk 
index. All case countries have climbed several rankings down the index between 2005 
and 2007, Estonia however is still the best ranking country at the 46th place, while 
Moldova ranks lowest at 135.  
 
Table 12. Risk Rating 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 The scale of indicators ranges from 1 to 4+. 1 represents little or no change from a rigid centrally 
planned economy and 4+ represents the standards of an industrialized market economy. 
 Estonia Hungary Romania Moldova 
 2007 2005 2007 2005 2007 2004 2007 2005 
Rank 46 42 41 38 66 60 135 130 
Overall Score (100) 66.01 17.71 69.08 67.57 56.55 50.61 33.89 33.19 
Performance (25) 19.33 17.71 11.32 10.04 8.25 6.9 4.02 4.39 
Political Risk (25) 10.03 9.33 15.84 17.07 14.78 12.47   
Credit Rating (10) 7.61 7.08 6.72 6.67 5.16 3.96 0-63 0 
Coface Risk Rating A2 A3 A5 D 
  
 
  Source: Compiled by author based on Euromoney and Coface 
 
Coface rates Moldova into group D as a country with a high-risk profile regarding 
economic and political environment and a very bad payment record. Estonia, Hungary 
and Romania are found in A2-A5 meaning that economic and political environments as 
well as payment record are acceptable, but not optimal. A5 being the worst in the A-
group. 
Inflation is an indicator of stability. High inflation rates indicate economic instability 
and risk for the investor. It was a high inflation rate, which prevented Estonia from 
joining the EMU as planned in 2007, however the rate is relatively stable comparing to 
Romania and Moldova, as can be seen in the Table 13.  
 
Table 13. Inflation percentage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by author based on Eurostat and the National  
Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova 
 
The inflation rate in Moldova reached 13% last year making it one of Europe’s highest. 
Although Hungary’s inflation rate is higher than the EU average, it is the lowest of the 
case countries, and the lowest the country has seen since the collapse of the USSR. 
 
Table 14. GDP growth in percentage 
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
Estonia 8,1 4,0 3,6 3,1 4,4 
Hungary 14,2 10 5,2 6,8 4,0 
Romania 59,1 45,7 22,5 1,9 6,6 
Moldova 18,2 18.4 4.4 12,5 13 
 Source: UNCTAD database 
 
A stable environment will support growth. Therefore, the GDP growth rate is included 
in this paragraph, as an indicator of stability (see Table 14 for GDP growth). In the later 
years, Estonia has been labelled one of the Baltic Tigers due to tremendous economic 
growth brought on by rapid economic reforms. In 2006, this lead to an impressing 
growth rate of 11.4 %, as can be seen in the table above. Estonia’s liberal politics have 
attracted much FDI, which in turn are believed to have fuelled this economic growth of 
proportions. Romania is likewise successful with a growth rate of 7,7 %. Romania’s 
GDP figures are among the absolute EU low, however they have been growing steadily 
with around 6% since 2001 and reaching 7,7% in 2006, in turn making it one of the 
countries with the highest growth rates inside the EU [Euler Hermes France (2007)]. 
Hungary and Moldova can only boost half of that, but even a growth rate of 4 % is more 
than many old member states can pride themselves of. 
 
Corruption: Empirical data suggest that there is indeed a negative correlation between 
host country corruption levels and FDI inflow [Johnson and Dahlstöm 2005: 21]. 
Corruption continues to affect business dealings around the world, mostly occurs 
because of lacking, modern institutions.  
Corruption was a highly debated topic prior to the last two EU enlargement rounds. It 
was especially questionable, whether Romania would be able to deal with this issue and 
bring it below acceptable norms. The fact that corruption is an illegal activity makes it 
hard to measure and evaluate, however the Global Corruption barometer, which scores 
are reflected in the table below, bases its evaluations on perceptions of corruptions from 
business people, locals and country analysts. The use of the perception of business 
people makes it very relevant in this context. They are the ones that come into contact 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 EI 
Combined 
Estonia 
7.3 8.1 10.5 11.4 1 
Hungary 3.4 5.2 4.1 3.9 2 
Romania 5.2 8.4 4.1 7.7 
 
3 
Moldova 6.6 7.3 7.5 4  4 
with host country institutions and bureaucrats, places where corruption is generally 
perceived to exist and affect business dealings [Ibid. 2005: 5]. The survey has 
concluded that Romania continues to be one of the most corrupt countries in the CEE. 
The most corrupt institutions being customs, judiciary, and political parties. According 
to the Heritage Foundation’s Freedom list corruption is also deemed a factor in 
Romania, even below Moldova, where corruption due to weak institutions however also 
remain an important issue.  
 
Table 15. Corruption Perception6 
 CPI Score Rank Corruption IE 
Estonia 6.7 24 64 1 
Hungary 5.2 41 50 2 
Romania 3.1 84 30 4 
Moldova 3.2 79 29 
 
3 
Source: Compiled by author based on Corruption Perception Index, Heritage Foundation 
 
In the Baltic countries corruption remains a smaller issue than in many neighbouring 
countries, however some corruption continues, mostly reflecting the common use of 
friendship networks often dating back to the Soviet era. In countries as small as Estonia, 
it continues to be an issue for foreign investor that “knowing somebody” is the key to 
knowledge and some times success [Berghäll 1999:72], but on the Corruption 
Perception Index as well as according to the Heritage Foundation, Estonia received the 
best ranking for least corruption of the case countries, followed by Hungary. 
 
Freedom: Freedom is an abstract concept, but for a market to have a liberal and 
working free market this concept is of outmost importance. In connection to investment 
economic freedom as well as political and civil freedom is important.   
In the case of economic freedom, Heritage House does a ranking based on several 
indicators ranging from business, trade, monetary and financial freedom to freedom 
from government and corruption.   
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 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt) 
Table 16. Economic Freedom Ranking7  
 Rank Business Trade Fiscal Monetary Financial Investment Labour 
Estonia 12 80 76,6 89,7 83 90 90 51,2 
Hungary 44 71,2 76,6 79,2 76,7 60 70 66,1 
Romania 67 70,9 74 91,7 69,7 60 50 61,4 
Moldova 81 70 74,4 90,4 68 50 30 61,2 
Source: Heritage Foundation  
 
Table 16 shows the ranking of the case countries, as well as a selected number of 
indicators. According to the Heritage Foundation’s 2007 index of economic freedom 
Estonia ranks 12th, making it no. 5 out of a total of 41 European countries. In Estonia 
monetary, business, investments, monetary and financial freedom are strong, and 
nothing directly negative is underlined, however high government spending and a rigid 
labour market are mentioned on the down side. Hungary ranks 44th, making it no. 25 
out of 41 European countries. Monetary, business, trade freedom, labour, investment 
and fiscal freedom are underlined as strong, only freedom from government intervention 
is considered weak. Romania is ranking 67th with strong fiscal, trade and financial 
freedoms, however bureaucracy and corruption pulls it downwards. As no. 33 of 41 
countries, Moldova occupies the 81st spot on the Economic Freedom Ranking index. 
Although trade, business and fiscal freedoms are considered strong, non-tariff barriers, 
restrictive customs and tough regulations are on the list of negatives. Monetary and 
investment freedoms are poor and corruption high cobbled with weak institutions. 
Freedom House each year prepares a measurement of freedom concerning civil liberties 
and political rights on a ranking from one to seven. One being most free. As shown in 
the table below three of the case countries are evaluated to be free. Only Moldova is 
categorised as partly free due to lacking civil liberties and political rights.  
 
Table 17. Freedom Ranking 
Country  Civil liberties Political rights Freedom 
ranking 
 IE 
(both tables 
included) 
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 Selected areas as percentage freedom of 100. 
Estonia 1 1 Free 1 
Hungary 1 1 Free 2 
Romania  2 2 Free 3 
Moldova 4 3 Partly Free 4 
Source: Freedom House 
 
Both freedom indexes conclude the same initial ranking of the case countries and one is 
tempted to conclude that fee civil liberties and political rights lead to free business as 
well. 
 
Ease Of Doing Business: The less bureaucracy the more attractive a country is for 
setting up business and production facilities. The World Bank’s “Ease of Doing 
Business” barometer measures the ease of doing business in 175 countries across the 
world using ten indicators studying various aspects of a countries business environment. 
Below Table 18 shows the rank of the case countries, and their ranking in three selected 
areas. 
 
Table 18. Ease of Doing Business 
 Rank Starting a 
Business 
Closing a 
business 
Employing workers IE 
Estonia 17 51 47 151 1 
Hungary 66 87 48 90 3 
Romania 49 7 108 78 2 
Moldova 103 84 78 128 
 
4 
Source: World Bank 
 
Estonia is without question the leader in this perspective with Moldova lacking far 
behind. Romania however has a remarkable ease in starting a business well ahead of 
even Estonia, which in turn is ranked exceptionally low on employing workers –even 
below that of Moldova. The rigid labour market situation in Estonia was also mentioned 
in the Economic Freedom Ranking evaluation. 
 
Competitiveness and Innovation: Central and Eastern Europe have during the 90s 
made their way up the competitiveness rank and have achieved status as the second most 
competitive region for investment on a global scale [Hoff 2006]. The regional 
differences however are striking. Estonia’s main competitive advantages are location, 
both as a platform to the rest of the Baltic region, as well as to Russia, furthermore well-
educated low-cost labour and good communication are highlighted [Berghäll1999:35]. 
These are undoubtedly also among the figures to put it up front in both the Global 
Competitiveness and the World Competitive Rankings carried out by World Economic 
Forum and IMD as can be seen below. World Economic Forum evaluates 125 
economies across the globe on indicators such as institutions, macro economy, business 
sophistication, market efficiency, technological readiness, infrastructure and education. 
IMD surveys 69 economies on infrastructure, economic performance, government and 
business efficiency. 
 
Table 19. Competitiveness Ranking 
 Global 
Competitiveness 
2006 Rank 
Global 
Competitiveness 
2006 Score 
Global 
Competitiveness 
2005 Rank 
World  
Competitiveness  
Ranking 
IE 
Estonia 25 5.12 26 20 1 
Hungary 41 4.52 35 41 2 
Romania 69 4.02 67 57 
 
3 
Moldova 96 3.71 89 na  4 
Source: Compiled by author based on World Economic Forum and IMD  
 
Estonia ranks highest in both scoreboards, well above Hungary. However in European 
context Hungary scores high on multiple advantages. It is to be found ranking fourth on 
the top five listing of in investor’s choices for manufacturing locations and 9/10 on 
production units. Hungary is fifth and Romania ninth on the top ten considerations for 
new investments or expansion [Hoff 2006]. Of the Top 15 European Countries measured 
by investment projects number Hungary scores the 8th place above Russia and Romania 
12th [Hoff 2006]. This is also reflected on the Competitive rankings that place Hungary 
and Romania on 41st and Romania on 69th/57th place. Moldova is unfortunately not to be 
found on among the top countries in the survey. Moldova is found in the bottom at the 
96th place in the Global Competitiveness Ranking, however not listed in the World 
survey. Neither was it in the Innovation Scoreboard’s survey. This survey places 
countries into four main groups Innovation leaders, followers, catching-up and trailers 
using a complex set of indicators divided into five dimensions measuring innovation 
drivers, knowledge creation, intellectual property, innovation, application and 
entrepreneurship [European Commission 2006:6]. The innovation leaders are Sweden, 
Switzerland, Finland, Denmark, Japan and Germany [Ibid. 2006:8], while Estonia and 
Hungary are categorized as trailing behind the EU25 [European Commission 2006:3]. 
Romania, who at the time of analysis was not yet a member of the EU, is in a separate 
cluster together with Cypress. A cluster categorized as fast growing and catching-up 
[Ibid. 2006:4]. 
 
Absorption Capacity and Investment Environment 
In the theoretical chapter, Absorption Capacity (AC) was mentioned as a vital necessity 
in order to attract spillover effects to the host economy, a much-desired effect of FDI. 
Before turning towards the actual figures of FDI, the gathered rankings will be used to 
evaluate the absorption capacity of the case countries. The theoretical framework 
established that needed components of absorption capacity were a highly competitive 
environment, high educational level of labour force, good infrastructure and a liberal 
business environment.  
One of the earlier indicators already determined competitiveness as well as 
infrastructure. Within the labour force indicator, we saw the levels of education in the 
case countries, and liberal business environment was a component of Freedom, as well 
as Ease of Doing Business. Those indicators have been compiled in the table below to 
give a realistic view of absorption capacity. 
 
Table 20. Absorption Capacity 
 Estonia Hungary Romania Moldova 
Competitiveness 1 2 3 4 
Well-educated labour force 1 2 3 4 
Liberal business 
environment 
1 2 3 4 
Infrastructure 2 1 3 4 
Total Points 5 7 12 16 
Rank 1 2 3 4 
Source: Compiled by author based on own estimates 
 
With five points out of sixteen Estonia clearly has the best conditions for absorption 
capacity, and thereby is most likely to enjoy the benefits of spillover effects such as 
technology and knowledge transfer. Closely behind is Hungary. Romania scores three in 
all categories and Moldova gathers sixteen out of sixteen points, having the least 
beneficial environment for spillover effects. 
 
Table 21 shows the total accumulated points of the broad analysis of Investment Environment. The indicators used have mainly 
focused on locational advantages of the case countries. According to the OLI framework earlier introduced, this is the one factor 
that a host economy itself can influence to attract foreign investors. Which makes it an important focus for all countries wishing to 
attract FDI. The outcome is not surprisingly equal to that of the absorption capacity with Estonia clearly in the lead with only 14 
points out of 32 and overall most locational advantages. Estonia’s main weak points were those of size and a rigid labour marked. 
Of minor issues are infrastructure, the political risk of being geographically so close to Russia and a lack of labour force, which 
however is not reflected in the overall summery. 
 
 
 
 
Table 21. Scoreboard of Investment Environment Points 
 Estonia Hungary Romania Moldova 
Size 
4 2 1 3 
Stability and 
growth 
1 2 3 4 
Infrastructure 2 1 3 4 
Ease of doing 
business 
1 3 2 4 
Competitiveness 1 2 3 4 
Corruption 1 2 4 3 
Labour market 3 3 3 1 
Freedom 1 2 3 4 
Total score 
14 17 22 27 
Ranking 
1 2 3 4 
 Source: Compiled by author based on own estimates 
 
Hungary comes second with seventeen points out of thirty-two. The strongest cards of 
Hungary are that of infrastructure, but also low corruption, freedom, and high 
competitiveness. Romania scores highest on size and ease of doing business, while 
growth and stability, together with labour market conditions, are pulling the large 
country down. Moldova was almost last in this in some aspect unfair comparison. High 
unemployment and low wages are sadly its strongest cards, with pretty much all other 
indicators lacking. 
Looking at actual FDI inward stock Romania and Hungary have the largest 
accumulation (See Figure 3). To eliminate the effect of size of the country and to 
conclude whether this analysis reflects the current investment environment, FDI per 
capita will be compared to the scores of the analysis (See Figure 4 and 5). 
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Figure 3. Inward FDI stock in million USD 
Source: Compiled by author based on Freedom House, UNCTAD 2006 
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Figure 4. Dynamics of FDI  
Source: Compiled by author based on Freedom House, UNCTAD 2006 
 
Looking at the dynamics of FDI in Figure 4 it becomes obvious that some countries had 
a better starting point in the new millennium. Estonia and Hungary have the highest FDI 
per capita stocks and have both been successful in attracting FDI with an all-time high 
in 2004. They are clearly developing faster than the other two case countries, but their 
growth has been slowing down, while Romania, a late starter, has begun to pick up. 
Since 2000, Moldova has also had a raise in inflow, although the dynamics of FDI 
inflow into the country are somewhat slower. The much-needed capital boost might 
very well lead to a better outcome for Moldova in such an analysis in future years. 
 
Figure 5 shows FDI per capita compared to the Investment Environment ranking and 
the ranking of the case countries in Absorption Capacity.  
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Figure 5. IE and AC Scores compared with FDI per capita 
Source: Compiled by author based on own estimates 
 
Table 5 show a clear distinction within the case countries. Estonia with the lowest score 
and the best ranking is clearly in the lead in FDI per capita, while Moldova, with the 
highest score and lowest ranking in both categories, has the lowest FDI per capita stock. 
Hungary, due to its larger size, has the largest FDI stock, but is second regarding FDI 
per capita. This can be taken as a clear indicator that good investment environment, as 
well as good absorption capacity, indeed is important when attracting FDI. The better 
the score of Investment Environment and Absorption Capacity the higher the FDI per 
capita 
 
 
2.3. Comparative Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment 
Incentive Policies in Estonia, Hungary, Romania and 
Moldova 
 
While not being the priority area in the first turbulent years after the collapse of the 
USSR, it took little less than a decade for the case countries to install a functioning 
Moldova 
Moldova 
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Romania 
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Estonia 
Estonia 
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r  
investment incentive system, beginning with the reducing of the strong trade barriers. 
The main catalyst for the changes being the sudden strong competition, as a huge 
number of countries emerging onto the world market at the same time all hungering for 
capital inflow. The systems in place are all unique in their build-up, although many 
similar tools are being used; for instance, all countries have used privatisation as a 
major tool, as well as established investment agencies and free trade zones along side a 
complicated net of tax incentives. Eligible for incentives in all case countries are foreign 
and domestic investors alike, although certain minor rule-based incentives in Hungary 
are targeted towards domestic companies only. 
 Hungary implemented one of the most generous incentive schemes, the generosity of 
which however has gradually been decreasing [Antaloczy and Sass 2001:13]. The 
incentive schemes have been marked by many changes, as the countries have learned 
from mistakes. As an example, Hungary offered tax holidays in the beginning 
exclusively to foreign companies, which lead to phantom joint ventures (with silent 
foreign partners). Strong preferential treatment of one side or another tends to inspire 
tricks to circumvent the laws and these rules have now been changed. In Hungary focus 
has been bigger on fiscal incentives than in Estonia, however many of those are 
currently being phased out [Antaloczy and Sass 2001:14/25-26]. The Estonian Tax 
Legislation has been under constant reform in the last 15 years. Most changes occurred 
in the early years of independence and the existing Law on Taxation came into effect in 
1994, however it has since gone through several amendments. Romania launched its 
new tax policy in January this year. Although the continuous shifts in policies have 
made some foreign investors cautious, especially in the first years, there is no doubt that 
they have overall had the desired effect. Billions of USD in FDI flow into CEE 
countries each year. 
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 Please note in the following paragraph that Romania is making amendments in its tax policies. As of 
January 2007, most tax incentives offered ceased and new incentives were introduced through a special 
Table 22. Fiscal Incentives 
 Estonia Hungary Romania Moldova 
Investment 
minimum 
No No USD 1 million No 
Corporate 
Income Tax 
26% 16 % 16% 15% 
Tax on dividends 26/74 of the 
amount of taxable 
payment 
36 %   
Eligibility for 
incentives 
Domestic and 
foreign investors 
Domestically 
registered legal 
persons, or 
economic 
societies, co-
operatives, 
entrepreneurs. In 
special cases only 
domestic firms 
Domestic and 
foreign investors 
meeting certain 
criteria 
Domestic and 
foreign investors 
Minimum 
investment 
requirement 
No No Depends on size 
and kind of 
company 
No 
Exemption from 
import 
duties/VAT on 
certain goods 
Technology 
related VAT 
reductions. 
Custom duties and 
VAT are not 
applied to 
imported inputs 
that later are to be 
exported  
Abolished in 
1993, but custom 
duties and VAT 
are not applied to 
imported inputs 
that later are to be 
exported 
Yes, in special 
cases. 
Foreign 
companies in 
Moldova do not 
have to pay 
customs on goods 
imported with the 
intend of 
exporting 
Corporate tax 
holidays 
There are no 
corporate income 
tax holidays.  
A wide variety of 
tax corporate tax 
holidays are 
offered depending 
on size of 
investment, region 
and amount of 
jobs created.  
Yes, local 
councils can grant 
new incentives for 
investments 
exceeding EUR 
500,000 including 
tax holidays 
Yes, for large 
investments  
Accelerated 
depreciation 
No 2 - 6 % for 
buildings, 33 per 
cent for 
machinery 
(technical), 20 % 
for vehicles and 
14 % for other 
machinery. 
Yes, on 
instalments and 
equipment 
considered 
necessary for the 
investment 
- 
Special 
deductions from 
the tax base 
There is no 
corporate income 
tax on retained 
earnings 
A 20 % deduction 
from the tax base 
of the direct costs 
linked to R+D 
Yes Yes 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Investment Law [PriceWaterHouseCoppers]. This paragraph deals with the old tax incentives, where not 
mentioned otherwise, as updates on the new initiatives have not been thoroughly available and also not yet 
been able to effect the FDI inflow. 
activities 
Possibility to 
carry forward 
losses 
Yes Yes Yes - 
Source: Compiled by author based on Antaloczy and Sass 2001: annex, PriceWaterHouseCoopers, EIA, 
ARIS, NAAI and ITD  
 
 
Estonia has no minimum investment requirements neither does Moldova. In Hungary, 
the previously required investment minimum of HUF 10 billion9 was abolished [ITD]. 
In Romania eligible for incentives are companies, whose investments exceed USD 1 
million [Larive Romania 2007].  
There is no profit tax in Estonia, instead the corporate tax of 22/78 is effective if the 
profit will be distributed. In the beginning of the millennium, the new Estonian 
government also abolished the previously applied 26% tax on reinvested earnings. 
Nevertheless, distributed profits, for example dividends, are taxed at a 22% rate [EIA]. 
Estonia holds the reputation of one of the most liberal tax regimes in the world. 
Romania and Hungary’s tax regimes might not be as equally liberal, but both boost a 
16% corporate tax level [ITD and ARIS], which is one of the lowest in Europe. In 
Romania the tax on dividends is between 5 - 10 % for individuals subsequently to 16%, 
while tax on capital gains range between 1-10% and again subsequently to 16% [Larive 
Romania]. In Moldova the standard income corporate tax rate is 15%, and there are no 
local-content or export performance requirements applied [UNCTAD 2004]. 
 Romania offers tax incentives based upon a division into three categories depending on 
the scale and objective of investments. Investments larger than EUR 75 million can be 
granted five years of incentives. Investments of a size ranging between EUR 25-75 
million may receive incentives for four years, whereas the final category of EUR 25 
million or less are eligible for incentives in 2,5 years. Investments have to meet certain 
criteria in order to benefit, such as focusing on R&D, social integration, development of 
HR, regional development or rehabilitation and protection of environment 
PriveWaterHouseCoopers]. Of other Romanian incentives can be mentioned 
exemptions and postponement of local taxes. 
Corporate tax holidays were mostly abolished in Estonia with the latest tax reform, but 
they are still applied in great number in Hungary. The corporate income tax may be 
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 Hungarian forint. 
reduced by up to 80 % under the title of investment tax benefit. However it has to meet 
certain criteria’s of for instance size and also the investment must be self-financed by 25 
percent of own resources and at least 30 % of the investment project must include new 
facilities or assets. Renovation cannot exceed 20 % of the investment costs [ITD]. Small 
enterprises who earn their money by providing services or realisation their own goods, 
are in a two-year-period entitled to 35% tax rate reduction in Moldova [UNCTAD 
2004]. Enterprises that carry out production activities or render services to the populace, 
with up to 19 employees, and which earnings amount to MDL10 3 million per year, are 
exempted from payments of income tax [Ibid. 2004].  
Estonia before becoming an EU member state had no import-export duties worth 
mentioning. After the 01.05.2004, Estonia took over the EU External Trade Policy 
regime and therefore the whole EU tariff system was implemented toward third 
countries. Foreign companies in Moldova do not have to pay customs on goods 
imported with the intend of exporting [Ibid. 2004]. Hungary abolished exemption on 
VAT and import duties in 1993, but offers VAT import in its free zones and industrial 
zones. In addition, custom duties and VAT are not applied to imported inputs that later 
are to be exported in neither Hungary nor Estonia. In Estonia the 18% compulsory VAT 
is found on almost all goods and services [EIA], however some technology related VAT 
(value added tax) reductions still apply [Antaloczy and Sass 2001:24-25]. Romania 
reformed its VAT and profit tax legislation in 2002, and offers exemption or reduction 
of VAT in special cases [PriceWaterHouseCoopers]. 
A 50% tax allowance running for a total of 5 years is offered in Hungary for 
investments in production facilities and hotels with an amount exceeding HUF 1 billion. 
This can be extended until 100%, if the investment is made in entrepreneurial or 
priority11 zone or creates more than 100 jobs. For instance a 100% tax allowances for 10 
years is offered to large investments exceeding 10 billion HUF, if they generate 500 
jobs within two years [Antaloczy and Sass 2001:annex]. Small- and medium-sized 
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 Moldavian leu. 
11
 Priority regions are northern Hungary, the northern and southern Great Plains, the central and southern 
Trans-Danubian planning/strategic region, the small regions of Celldömölk, Letenye, İriszentpéter, Tét, 
Vasvár and Zalaszentgrót within the western Trans-Danubian [ITD]. 
(SME)12 corporate tax payers in Hungary are subject to certain tax allowances such as a 
deduction of 40 % of the interest on an investment loan (including financial leasing) 
from the corporation tax payable EUR 24,000 per year  [ITD]. In Romania, according to 
the new law of 2007, local councils can grant certain incentives for a period of up to 
three years in the case of investments completed and commissioned by 01.01.2007. 
Those incentives entail exemptions for land and building tax and a reduced tax rate of 
0.25%, when computing the building tax for investments exceeding EUR 500,000. In 
Moldova a 50% profit tax exemption is provided for foreign investors, if their equity 
capital is larger than USD 250,000, and more than 50% of the income it generates is 
from sale of services or own goods [UNCTAD 2004].  
Estonia has not implemented accelerated depreciation as an incentive, but both Romania 
and Hungary do. In Romania, accelerated depreciation is offered for installations and 
equipment necessary for the investment. In Hungary, the accelerated depreciation rate is 
2-6% for buildings, 33 % for technical machinery, 20% for vehicles and 14 % for other 
machinery.  
In Moldova, the tax liable income of companies can be deducted by 50% from the 
income tax, if the investments are made for the purchase or construction of fixed assets, 
as long as the cost of the assets is not larger than the amount of the taxed income [Ibid. 
2004]. In Estonia tax concessions apply, and companies can deduct expenses from 
taxable income used on acquiring or upgrading fixed assets, if those companies are 
based in other regions than Tallinn and the neighbouring areas [Antaloczy and Sass 
2001:24-25].  
Hungary offers a 20% deduction from tax base in the case of direct costs linked to R&D 
activities [Ibid. 2001:annex]. Certain expenses are deductable in Romania such as 
expenses for training and development of the employees and management, R&D 
expenditure and environmental protection [PriceWaterHouseCoopers]. 
 In Hungary, Estonia and Romania it is possible to carry forward losses, in Romania, 
this is possible for 5 years [Larive Romania 2007]. Furthermore, companies in Romania 
are exempt from paying land tax on land, on which buildings or other constructions are 
standing, if said buildings are used for agriculture [PriceWaterHouseCoopers].  
                                                 
12
 Small- and medium-sized are those who do not employ over 250 employees and do not have net sales 
revenues exceeding EUR 16 million Also the share of any 3rd party (including the state) most not be 
higher than 25% [ITD]. 
 Financial incentive policies (monetary) 
Table 23. Financial Incentives 
 Estonia Hungary Moldova Romania 
Prioritised areas  Innovation and 
R&D 
R&D on 
agriculture and 
environmental 
friendly initiatives 
- (Scientific and 
high-tech 
production) 
Target 
development 
allocation 
No Yes, for rural and 
technological 
development 
- - 
Preferential 
credit 
No Yes Yes - 
Export 
guarantees 
Yes Yes - - 
 
  
  
Job creation 
and training 
grants 
Yes Only domestic 
firms 
- - 
Source: Compiled by author based on Antaloczy and Sass 2001: annex, PriceWaterHouseCoopers, EIA, 
ARIS, NAAI and ITD  
 
In Estonia, the prioritised areas covered by financial incentives include innovation and 
R&D projects, while Hungary alongside R&D is focusing on agriculture and 
environmental friendly initiatives. Moldova is very focused on attracting FDI flows into 
scientific and high-tech production areas [UNCTAD 2002], but the actual financial 
incentives are scarce and even intensive research has not been able to distinguish 
specific financial incentives for Moldova. In Romania companies are eligible for 
preferential interest loans subsidised by the state up to 30%, state guaranteed loans and 
other subsidies [Ibid.]. In addition, Romania offers permanent financial assistance for 
SME development [Aris]. Estonia is also interested in supporting SMEs and supports 
SME job creation and training. These areas are also covered in Hungary, but only to the 
benefit of domestic firms [Antaloczy and Sass 2001:16]. Hungary also uses financial 
incentives such as preferential credit schemes and grants. Not all however are open to 
foreigners such as a special programme for providing below market rate credits for 
SME development. [Ibid. 2001:25-26]. In Estonia, there are no preferential credits 
given, [Ibid. 2001: annex]. In 2000 Hungary abolished targeted development allocation 
for economic development, however targeted development allocation for rural and 
technological development are open to foreign and domestic firms alike, so are the 
schemes for development of tourism, agricultural activities and environmental 
protection as well as the labour market fund. In Estonia, companies in rural areas are 
offered interest and guarantee support [Ibid. 2001: annex]. Both the Estonian and 
Hungarian government offer export guarantees. 
 
Rule-based incentive instruments 
Table 24. Rule-based Incentives 
 Estonia Hungary Romania Moldova 
Provision of low-
priced real estate 
No (Yes, 
municipalities) 
Yes Yes, in special 
cases 
Special 
institutional 
support 
Yes, Estonian 
Investment 
Agency: 
www.investinesto
nia.com 
 
Yes, Hungarian 
Investment and 
Trade 
Development 
Agency: 
www.itdh.com/en
gine.aspx 
Yes, Romanian 
Agency for 
Foreign 
Investment: 
www.arisinvest.ro
/ 
Yes, National 
Agency for 
Attracting 
Investments: 
www.naai.moldov
a.md/ 
Programmes to 
support small 
and medium 
sized enterprises 
Yes, export 
promotion grants 
and free advisory 
services  
 
Available only for 
Hungarian 
entrepreneurs 
(exception from 
national 
treatment) 
Yes - 
Simplified 
export/import 
procedures 
Yes, when 
operating in the 
free zone 
Yes, when 
operating in the 
free zone 
Yes, when 
operating in the 
free zone 
Yes, when 
operating in the 
free zone 
Free economic 
zones 
Yes The possibility 
exists, however no 
zones are 
currently 
registered. 
Yes Yes 
Industrial parks Under 
construction 
Yes, with 
government 
support 
Yes Yes 
Source: Compiled by author based on Antaloczy and Sass 2001: annex, PriceWaterHouseCoopers, EIA, 
ARIS, NAAI and ITD  
 
While financial incentives have not been highly prioritised, the use of rule-based 
incentive instruments has become highly popular in transition countries. In the target 
countries, especially the establishment of free zones and investment agencies have been 
the first steps on the way, but also more often regional cooperation is taken into 
consideration. Regional cooperation has the positive effect that it can cerate larger 
market size and attract investors, who would otherwise not show interest for small 
countries. Intra-Baltic co-operation is a key word in Estonia, facing the fact that its 
market size is limited and that foreign investors often see the Baltic countries as one 
joined entity. While regional integration frameworks can cover policies from tariff 
reduction to policy harmonization [UNCTAD 1998:28-29], it so far mostly centres on 
Internet informational pages and promotional materials [Antaloczy and Sass 2001:24-
25]. All countries have signed a significant number of bilateral treaties. 
 In ways of using the actual FDI as a tool itself in terms of labour market or structural 
policy, Estonia and Hungary both offer favourable conditions for investors investing in 
rural areas or and high unemployment regions [Ibid. 2001:17]. 
Furthermore, in Hungary, local governments can also offer incentive schemes besides 
the ones already on offer from the government; these incentives include preferential real 
estate prices, exemption of local tax and free of charge elements of infrastructure. 
[Antaloczy and Sass 2001:25-26] 
Special programmes to support SMEs are offered widely, for instance in Estonia via 
export promotion grants and free advisory services. On the other end of the scale there is 
no doubt that large projects enjoy a special status in most countries and can negotiate 
special incentives for themselves. This is not a phenomenon exclusively seen in 
transition economies and some countries, such as Estonia, have officially stated that it is 
not done [Ibid. 2001:14]. Underlining this preferential treatment is setting a minimum 
investment level, as is used in Hungary for receiving certain grants and allowances. In 
Romania according to the new law of 2007 local councils can grant new incentives for 
investments exceeding EUR 500,000. In addition, the Romanian incentive package 
include right to use state or local authority properties as domain and free access to 
utilities [PriceWaterHouseCoopers]. 
 
Investment agencies are established in all CEE countries, common for all is that they do 
not only offer information, but also offer to act as the binding link between investors 
and domestic companies, as well as acting as mediators between investors and 
government institutions. The Estonian investment agency, the EIA, was established in 
1994 financed by the EU Phare Programme budget, and falls under the jurisdiction of 
the Estonian Trade and Investment Board. The Hungarian counterpart to the EIA the 
ITD Hungary (Investment and Trade Development Agency) was established in 1993. 
Although it is established by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, local governments and 
chambers of commerce are also involved. The Investors Council established in 1997 by 
the Ministry of Economy at present hold 70% of the invested capital [Antaloczy and 
Sass 2001:25-26]. In this year 2007 it will however be undergoing major restructuation 
from functioning under the Ministry of Economy in order to turn into a non-profit 
company as of July 1, 2007 [ITD]. The ministry will keep its majority share and the 
Hungarian Development Bank controlling up to 49% of shares. The tasks carried out 
will be the same, mostly investment promotion and company-related trade development 
tasks focusing on facilitating the operations of SMEs [Ibid.]. Moldova’s Investment 
Agency is in short named NAAI and was established in 1997. The status of NAAI is 
defined as a permanent state non-commercial coordination and expertise service 
[NAAI]. In Romania, the investment agency is called ARIS and comes with little 
information of its origin. The main aim of the Investment Agencies is to help foreign 
actors locate domestic locations and business partners, and supply information of 
special help or interest to foreign investors, such as general and industry specific fact 
sheets about a country and its investment opportunities, help with legal matters 
regarding how to establish a company or apply for residence permit. Furthermore, some 
of the homepages, Estonia and Hungary’s being the best developed, contain sector 
analysis, descriptions of labour market, foreign trade and tax legislation. 
 
Establishing special zones is another well-known and used tool of FDI promotion all 
over the CEE region. Free zones may gain importance also in the future, as they have 
the advantage of reducing cost as well as risk for foreign investors. In Estonia, the 
Customs Law allows the establishment of these so-called free zones should the 
government so decree. There are in total four special zones, but only the Muuga port 
established in 1997 is currently in use. The three other zones are located in Sillamäe, 
Voru and Valga, all regions with high unemployment rates. In addition, the former 
restricted military base of Paldiski close to Tallinn has applied for a free zone status 
[Berghäll 1999:61]. The definition and rules applied to special zones vary. In Estonia, 
they are classified as customs territory with a duty free zone within. The benefits of the 
Estonian free zone are duty exemptions and other export-oriented incentives, also aimed 
at both foreign and domestic operators. Most of the activities in the zones are simple 
dealings such as packing, labelling or sorting goods. [Antaloczy and Sass 2001:24-25]. 
Muuga Port is an important transit hub, the other zones however resemble industrials 
zones more than free zones, as they also allow for assembly, production and other 
industrial operations in an attempt to fight the high unemployment rates in their areas 
[Bergman 2000:85]. 
 In Moldova free enterprise zone have been established with the intention of attracting 
FDI and Technology [UNCTAD 2004]. The first zone was established in Chisinau in 
1996 and currently four more are being established in the North and South of the 
country. In those free zones the Moldavian government has applied a very favourable 
system of import-export, tax, currency, credit-financial, registration and customs. 
[NAAI]. In an attempt of attracting specialists and investments into the domain of 
production organization and management other free zones such as technical-scientific, 
transit, bank, insurance and development of export and import-substituting goods can be 
established [Ibid.]. Foreign investors will furthermore be exempted from customs duties 
for such imported goods (raw materials, half-finished products, etc.) that are used for 
the manufacturing of goods to be exported. Companies residing within the free zones, 
who have invested USD 250,000 or more into their production facilities are in a period 
of three yeas exempt from paying income tax. Larger investments such as USD 500,000 
and above are exempt in five years and over USD 1 million are exempt from income tax 
for a period of ten years [Ibid.].  
Hungary, prior to the EU accession, had a unique environment regarding free zones. 
Besides several industrial parks, which offered services, local tax advantages and good 
infrastructure, all companies were allowed to set up their own free zone into which they 
duty-free could import high value added equipment for own use, there were not even 
geographical restrictions. This was mainly an attraction for export oriented assembly 
companies that are attracted by skilled and cheap local labour [Antaloczy and Sass 
2001:25-26]. The establishment of free zones was supported by the Ministry of 
Economy and attracted huge sums of Greenfield investments. It was calculated that 
before entering into the European Union 130 designated free zones were operating inside 
Hungary [Sheane 2006]. However, with the need to comply with EU regulation, all 
licenses were cancelled. Companies were offered the choice of transferring their assets 
to a non-designated status without VAT or Customs obligation or apply for a new 
permit, which would allow them to continue their activities in a modified environment. 
No companies applied for new permits, instead they choose to transfer their assets and 
operate under designated status [Ibid. 2006]. In Romania, there are currently six free 
trade zones, four of which have access to waterways. They are located in Sulina, 
Constanta-Sud, Braila, Galati, Curtici-Arad and Giurgiu and vary in size from 7 ha to 
150 ha. [Ibid. 2006]. In Romania’s industrial parks, there are no property tax on 
buildings and no land tax on land [PriceWaterHouseCoopers]. When signing the 
agreement with the government investors gain rights to the use of buildings and land for 
up to 50 years. In addition, the companies are entitled to import raw material without 
paying customs. Companies within those zones represent a mixture of shipyards, 
storage, packaging, processing, handling materials, and trading [Sheane 2006].  
 
Summery 
As it is not possible to quantify the incentive schemes and evaluate them based on the 
model applied in the previous chapter, a qualitative evaluation will be implied instead.  
 
Table 25. Incentive Ranking 
 Estonia Hungary Romania Moldova 
Ranking 2 1 3 4 
Source: Compiled by author based on own estimates 
 
Looking at it from that approach Hungary would rank first, as the country makes use of, 
despite many changes, the most developed incentive system with a competitive tax 
base, accelerated deprivations, special deductions, tax holidays and the possibility to 
carry forward losses. It has for many years been the frontrunner in CEE in terms of FDI 
inflow. Lately the other countries have begun to catch up with Hungary and the growth 
has begun to slow. This would indicate that it would be time to focus efforts elsewhere 
also. A first step could be to employ the same grants and incentives to foreign and 
domestic actors alike. Even though only few instruments are offered exclusively to 
domestic firms, equal treatment might very well create a positive image and attract 
some extra investors. The next step would be to expand the financial and rule-based 
instruments as well. 
On the second place would come Estonia with its very liberal and non-
interventionalistic stance on FDI policy, despite recent changes brought on by EU 
membership. The country already has great success in attracting investors, despite the 
fact that the use of government incentive tools is far from as developed as the schemes 
in Hungary. There are no accelerated depreciation, no major special deductions, no 
target development allocation and no preferential credit, but Estonia has none the less 
had great success in attracting FDI into the relatively small country. Already around 
2003 Estonia caught up with and overtook Hungary in terms of FDI per capita. One of 
the reasons could very well be that Estonian policy makers have successfully 
understood to use other instruments than incentives. They have focused on the broad 
policy areas and on creating a stable and attractive macroeconomic environment, which 
in the long run might very well proof to have a better long-term effect than a narrow 
focus on fiscal incentives. While tax holidays as given in Hungary, Romania and 
Moldova may attract new investments, the no tax on reinvested earnings in Estonia 
keeps please investors already present and probably attracts new investors also.  
 Romania has had an impressive growth in inflow in the later years (See Figure 3) 
following upon restructurations, and it most be assumed that the newly implemented tax 
policies will continue to attract FDI into the country, which has enormous potential. 
This earns Romania the third place in ranking on the use of incentives. However, a shift 
towards also using more developed financial policy tools, as apposed to the very strong 
focus on fiscal incentives might very well prove profitable for Romania, and for 
Moldova as well, where the absence of any financial incentives seems striking. The use 
of financial incentives could for instance help the governments divert FDI to prioritised 
sectors and rural, undeveloped regions. Romania already has a competitive corporate 
tax level, exemptions in special cases on import duties, as well as accelerated 
depreciation and special deductions from the tax base. Also free economic zones, 
industrial parks and an investment agency are in place, but still further expansions of the 
incentive area would be advisable. 
Moldova has the lowest corporate income tax and many generous tax incentives, as well 
as industrial parks and investment agencies. Moldova’s main problem in attracting FDI 
does not necessarily lie within its incentive policies, but is more likely to be found in the 
general lack of stability and macroeconomic issues of the country. It is a good example 
of how incentive policies only are effective if the investment climate is also stable and 
attracting. This is underlined by the previously introduced Economic Freedom Ranking 
index, which stressed Moldova’s non-tariff barriers, restrictive customs and tough 
regulations as affecting its freedom. Monetary and investment freedoms are poor and 
corruption high cobbled with weak institutions. Moldova is also a small country, 
however as the case of Estonia shows, this does need to be a hindrance as such. 
Accelerated write-offs as applied in Hungary and Romania could be a good choice for 
Moldova, as it reduces the expenses for investors, while encourages them to invest in 
new equipment, machinery and buildings. 
 All case countries, except Hungary in a few cases, offer the same incentive packages to 
domestic and foreign firm, this is a very positive decision, as many other countries have 
not yet applied this logic to their policymaking. In the future, this might very well help 
distinguish all them positively. 
  
 
 
3. FUTURE PERSPECTIVES OF FDI POLICIES  
 
In research literature there used to be the agreement that when searching for a location 
in which to invest, economic fundamentals in the host country such as good 
infrastructure, market size, macroeconomic and political stability, level of income, trade 
policies and eventual natural resources were the vital indicators [Blomström and Kokko 
2003:4]. Market size is no longer alpha and omega, as shipment of goods become easier 
and cheaper and local customers are no longer so vital, as they once were. Small 
markets with favourable climates are now just as attractive as large markets [Narula and 
Portelli 2004]. Estonia is a brilliant example of this. What is important is understanding 
the advantage points of a country and designing the right policy portfolio. When 
Dunning expanded his eclectic framework, he added the IDP path to show that different 
host country advantages are present on different development levels. Looking at the 
analysis outcome and this theory Hungary and Estonia can be found on stage three, 
where there is a gradual decrease of FDI and increase of outflow of investments. The 
domestic wages are growing and labour intensive production will diminish. Competition 
between domestic and foreign firms will start. Romania and Moldova can be found one 
step lower, on step two, with FDI inflow starting to increase, but still with a very low 
outflow, if any. Main target for foreign investors are still industries based on raw 
material and oriented to export. Cheap labour will be used heavily to market products 
for the investor home market. These are important points to keep in mind, when 
designing future frameworks for policy incentives. 
Liberal policy frameworks are no longer the magic recipe for attracting FDI, now the 
frameworks included into FDI policies needs to expand and begin focusing on 
incorporating other policy areas into the existing portfolio. In the beginning of the 
1990s opening up to foreign investments might have seem hazardous and demanded a 
big change both mentally and policy-wise, but now, not even two decades later, few will 
argue that it was not a beneficial and wise decisions. Now when the countries of the 
CEE have gotten over the initial scepticism towards foreign firms and FDI and have in 
most cases established a working incentive system and a sound investment 
environment, they need to start focusing on the new changes and challenges coming 
their way, if they wish to keep the inflow of FDI heading their way. Hungary is a 
country, which in the past has received substantial inflow, but is now in need of 
expanding its framework and focusing elsewhere to be sure to continue to receive large 
amounts of FDI. However local environment and absorption capacity continue to be 
essential. Therefore, a competitive local business climate and local learning capability 
are as important, as they were ten years ago. A welcoming and stable macroeconomic 
environment will never become obsolete. A country like Moldova, which has a working 
incentive system, but a unstable environment, is an example of what happens if the first 
basic steps on the way to attracting investments are ignored.  
The incentive package itself needs to apply equal terms for all investors. The case 
countries in question here have all applied that to a large extend, which is very positive. 
In addition, the incentive package should be devised to promote linkages and R&D 
activities [UNCTAD 2001]. Domestic companies should not be forgotten, they need 
subsidizing in order to maintain the competitive climate and strengthen their internal 
absorption capacity, so that they can benefit from technology transfer and knowledge 
potentials [Blomström and Kokko 2003:19]. Incentives should furthermore promote the 
education and training of locals. Investments need to go into HR, improving 
infrastructures, education, developing the financial sector and creating proactive 
institutions. In addition countries need to also broaden their scope; liberal policies and 
freedoms are still keywords in keeping the flow, but now free repatriation of profits and 
free transactions are also important [Varblane 2000], as are focus on long-term 
economic development strategy and co-ordination between policy areas [Sass 2003:21].   
The natural next steps for the case countries would be a move away from the heavy 
focus on fiscal policies. As has already been stressed, it is natural that developing and 
transitional economies focus heavily on these areas, however more developed 
economies shift focus towards financial incentives and other policies. One of the most 
beneficial moves for al involved parties would be to stop regarding investment 
incentives as a policy regarding foreign investors, and towards considering it part of 
economic policies in general, as a natural part of a countries overall industrial policy 
[Blomström and Kokko 2003:19-21]. Industrial policies are important for the effects 
and inflows of FDI already, so integrating it would only seem a logical step. 
Policymakers will also in the future need to focus their attention on new sources of FDI. 
Forecasts shows that FDI will start to develop onto the service sector, and policymakers 
will need to be ready to maximize the potential of this development [UNCTAD 
2006:36]. If Moldova is able to shift its focus to the new sectors, it might be able to 
benefit from this development. 
Another step that is already in the making is a theme, previously only shortly touched 
upon in this thesis: multilateral policy coordination. Estonia is already evolved in this 
on many levels via Baltic cooperation and on a higher level Hungary and Romania and 
Estonia are together in the EU. Cooperation on multiple levels might very well be the 
way forward to setting the “rules of the game”. An overall policy approach would also 
help eliminate any damaging regional incentive competition [Sass 2003:23].  
Nevertheless, as regional cooperation becomes more common and broader, the 
individual countries will simultaneously need to step up their game and distinguish 
themselves both in order to attract investments, but also to deal with challenges that 
come with the new time and new development, such as cross-boarder migration. As 
mentioned previously 30% of the Moldavian work force is estimated to have left the 
country [National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova]. Human capital is 
increasingly becoming a commodity, as geographical mobility becomes easier. High 
skilled workers are on demand in almost all countries, and they will increasingly be 
willing to leave their home countries to seek opportunities abroad. Countries investing 
in education can no longer rely on the fact that their investments will pay of, as their 
students may very well leave the country after graduation [Birkenshaw 2005:18]. It 
becomes a new challenge for host government’s policymakers to not only invest in 
education, but also invest in and develop ways to attract human capital from abroad, 
either via foreign students attending their educational facilities, or by making their 
countries interesting places to work for employees from other nations. Brain gain versus 
brain drain has already been buzz words for a decade and the competition will only 
increase, especially in CEE where low wages will tempt the highly skilled to go west. In 
Bulgaria 65 % graduates left the country for jobs abroad just during the last decade 
[Ibid. 2005:19]. The high levels of salary in its neighbouring Scandinavian countries 
will increasingly pressure the wages in Estonia, and while Moldova’s wages, the lowest 
in Europe, might be a strong card in attracting investors, it is a week card in terms of 
keeping the labour force at home. The picture in Estonia is quite different if estimates 
are correct that 3,000-4,000 will immigrate a year, however as it is estimated that most 
of them are temporarily leavers, the Estonian brain drain might very well be beneficial 
as in morphs into brain circulation [Chandler et al. 2003:33]. Namely, scholars are 
beginning to talk about brain circulating instead of brain drain, meaning when the 
skilled individuals move around between countries and may eventually return home, or 
at least create linkages and network back to the home countries, if so prompted 
[Birkenshaw 2005:20]. All case countries could benefit highly from this. As human 
capital becomes a sparse commodity they most work hard to attract new individuals to 
enter the country on all levels, overcoming stereotypes abroad, making entry 
legislations more flexible and less bureaucratic and not the last overcome their fears of 
foreigners entering into high ranking jobs [Ibid. 2005:18]. This will require new policy 
approaches and working to branding the country positively abroad. 
An important tool in this branding process is the Investment Promotion Agencies. All 
case countries presented have already set up such an office, which offers information 
about the country, help in legal matters and links to governments and domestic firms, 
however in the future their tasks could devolve significantly. According to Spee [2005], 
due to the use of the Internet, the communication of host country information will no 
longer be their main task, however he suggest many other ways in which the offices 
could become important tools later on in the process.  
They will need to tailor value propositions focusing on unique and limited markers of 
the region. What are the strengths and unique environment of the country? Is there a 
business clientele to which their region would be especially lucrative? Moreover, not 
only should they tailor these propositions and offer them to interested clients, they 
should become more pro-active in their work targeting potential investors, so that they 
not only welcome new investors but also attract them. Keeping the contact with 
investors and being helpful even after the set-up of their businesses is also a valuable 
asset. Service most be value-added and staff experienced and professional, changes in 
the environment most be monitored. Links to governments, domestic firms and NGOs 
will continue to be important advantages and links should be expanded and evolved. 
Investment promotion will turn into a business in itself. In addition, as the agencies 
become more proactive, they will increase their knowledge of the region and of the 
potential investors, and in this, they would be able to move from simply relaying policy 
decisions to investors to actively participate in policy shaping. Who better to know, 
what would be beneficial [Spee 2005:119]? 
On a final note, countries should not forget about outward investments. Estonia and 
Hungary are already having a rather large outflow of FDI, but this is also crucial in the 
future. When it comes to outward stock, Estonia is also a special and interesting case. 
Together with Hungary, it is the CEE country with the largest outflow of FDI in relation 
to country size. Due to a conservative fiscal policy, Estonia has one of the lowest budget 
deficits in the CEE [Varblane et al. 2003]. Moreover, government policy makers could 
possible learn from other emerging economies such as China in that respect. The 
Chinese government has prompted and helped domestic firms acquire foreign 
companies in an attempt to gain management expertise as well as overtaking the brand 
recognition of the foreign company and enter foreign markets that way or simply 
establishing a strong brand presence in general [Zedtwitz 2005:62]. Acquisitions as 
apposed to Greenfield investments also offer an ”easy” shortcut to service channels and 
distribution networks. The Chinese government has in this case made policies in order 
to support internationalisation, has set-up an online information platform and has helped 
a large number of companies expand and go abroad. In addition, large investments into 
education in for instance languages have been made [Ibid. 2005:64-65]. 
 
As the increase of government subsidies continues, and the areas covered in the FDI 
framework keep expanding, there is the risk that despite spillover benefits the 
companies investing are the net beneficiaries [Sass 2003:7]. However, it is the host 
countries role to create its policy so that it can maximize profits and make sure that both 
the host country and the foreign investor are winners. When creating incentives it is also 
vital to be aware that the higher the lacks of transparency in policies are the higher the 
risk for rent seeking and corruption. When designing government policies transparency 
is the key [Blomström and Kokko 2003:17]. 
There is no doubt that FDI will keep evolving and probably during the next years 
present very different challenges to host policy makers; New players will emerge and 
new sectors be targeted; new laws and methods will be needed to cope with this as well 
as a quicker response time to changes in the environment. Moreover, the host 
governments themselves will need to become involved in a completely new way. In 
order to succeed in the continuously more global world new opportunities most be 
grasped as they arise. Changes in the environment most be closely monitored. 
Flexibility and adjustment are called for. Threats most be eliminated as they arise, and 
new policies most be implemented effectively responding to market needs and 
demands. The CEE countries have earlier shown their willingness and capability to 
adapt and quickly reform, this is a strength that should be nurtured also in the future. 
  
 
 
CONCLUSION  
Host country governments have invested much time and consideration into designing 
complicated, liberal policy networks in order to attract FDI and the benefits that come 
with it such as capital, knowledge, technology, competition and a raise of exports and 
employment. Now however empirical research has shown that in the growing 
competition, creative and liberal investment incentives are no longer enough to attract 
FDI inflow. In addition, it is no longer enough to focus on, or posses, a few locational 
advantages. A country most be able to present a wide and possibly unique policy 
portfolio with a combination of incentive schemes, valuable host country determinants 
and a good, stable investment environment. It is important for government policy 
makers to continue elaborating and adjusting the framework with various layers of 
policies in order to continue to benefit from the inflow, to strengthen educational levels 
and infrastructure. It is up to the host governments to deliver the right conditions in 
order to attract FDI, while maximising benefits and minimising negative effects of the 
inflow. The governments themselves are vital players with regard to creating the right 
environment for absorption capacity and creating opportunities for the important inter-
linkages. At the same time they most also adjust to policy frameworks from above as 
results of regional cooperation, bi-, and multilateral agreements. 
The objective of this thesis was to analyse investment environment and the incentive 
schemes in the four transition countries Estonia, Hungary, Romania and Moldova. The 
outcome of the broad analysis of investment environment was very clear. Estonia 
possesses the best investment environment in terms of stability, ease of doing business, 
a highly competitive market, low corruption and freedom. Only in labour market terms, 
size and with regard to infrastructure was the leading position not in hand. Hungary on 
the other hand scored highest on infrastructure, although also doing remarkably well in 
most other categories with the exception of labour market and ease of doing business. 
Regarding labour market conditions, Moldova had its one victory, otherwise it had to be 
content with facing less corruption perception than its large neighbour Romania and 
being slightly bigger in relation to population and area than Estonia. Size was 
Romania’s largest locational advantage, alongside amazing ease of starting a business, 
while corruption was Romania’s biggest challenge. 
The analysis of incentive schemes suggests that the theory regarding the use of fiscal 
policies as the ultimate focus area in transitional countries is very much reflected in the 
case countries. All four case countries have a functioning incentive system in place. 
Hungary has a remarkably well developed and generous incentive scheme, while 
Estonia seems to have understood the vital importance of a more broad policy approach. 
Both countries are front-runners in attracting FDI, but both need to keep adjusting and 
expanding their policy areas, if this is to continue. Hungary could beneficially choose to 
eliminate the last differences in incentives offered to domestic and foreign investors. 
This would in turn eliminate bureaucracy and help create transparency in the intricate 
web of incentives. Romania and Moldova are still somewhat behind Hungary and 
Estonia in terms of FDI per capita, although Romania has shown an impressive growth 
rate. It would be beneficial for Romania and Moldova to focus on financial incentives as 
a supplement to the fiscal ones already in place. All countries have shown a will to 
reform their systems, which is a positive feature. Estonia deserves praise for its 
transparent and liberal system. Furthermore, the country has managed to embrace the 
idea of regional cooperation, while maintaining its own unique policy portfolio.  
Moldova receives the smallest amount of FDI inflow, also compared to other European 
countries. Since 2000, the inflow has however begun to pick-up and one most hope that 
continuous improvements to the policy system will continue to create larger amounts of 
inflow. A well-developed fiscal incentive is in place with competitive corporate income 
tax and other generous tax incentives, but the use of financial incentives as well could 
help development in undeveloped regions. For Moldova, the main challenge in the 
future will be eliminating macroeconomic imbalances and creating a stable investment 
environment politically and economically. Focus should be on core policies as well as 
the macroeconomic environment. Investments into the basic infrastructure will need to 
be improved and after that, focus on the incentive portfolio can be made. Incentives 
only seem to be justified if the potential of them can be fully used, this demands that the 
foreign affiliates attracted are different than the local firms, and that they have some 
assets which can spill over to the host nation, which than in turn needs to be on a certain 
level in order to absorb the spillover. An interesting step for Moldova would be trying 
to attract inflow into the emerging new FDI sectors such as service, but it needs to 
overcome the other challenges and stop the threatening labour market migration first.  
Romania has just recently reformed its tax policy showing that it has learned and been 
ready to reform. This kind of flexibility and adjustment is important in today’s 
environment, the faster countries can learn from their mistakes and adjust to demands in 
the environment, the more they will benefit in the long run, which also the later years 
impressive growth in Romania has shown.  
Even for countries doing well in the game of FDI, as Estonia and Hungary, adjustments 
are necessary to stay in the race. FDI policies have expanded; the policy areas that are 
connected with FDI will unquestingly continue to do so in order to meet new standards 
and new competition. It is important also to support domestic firms by investing into 
learning, so that they can benefit from potential spillovers and the competitive 
environment. The expansion of tools and policies has only just begun. In a more 
internationalised world, where decisions are being made faster, there is also the risk that 
companies are less stabile, less bound to location, therefore governments face the risk 
that companies, as well as labour force, move on to more favourable climates faster than 
before, possible before they have had any real positive effect on the host nation. It 
continues to be the main task of the host country policy makers to design the right 
policy decisions that will also be beneficial and competitive in the long run. 
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Resume 
 
Inflowet af udenlandske investeringer på verdensplan er mere en tredoblet indenfor de seneste to årtier. Mens man i Vesten kæmper for at 
beholde produktionsvirksomhederne på hjemmebane, har man i Central- og Østeuropa siden Sovjetunionens sammenbrud, og dermed kollapset af 
det planøkonomiske system, kæmpet hårdt for at tiltrække flest mulige udenlandske investeringer til de tidligere så lukkede økonomier. Håbet er 
at de udenlandske investeringer vil kunne kickstarte den økonomiske vækst ved at tilføje kapital og arbejdspladser, samt højne velfærd og 
konkurrenceevne. 
 
“Forskellen på at føre den rigtige og den forkerte regeringspolitik har aldrig været større” 
[Summers 1995]. 
 
I kampen om at tiltrække udenlandske investeringer er investeringsklimaet og det 
komplicerede net af politiske tiltag, der udgør investeringsfremmearbejdet, af den 
højeste betydning. Dette speciale fokuserer på investeringsklimaet og de 
motivationsfremmende politikker anvendt i fire særligt udvalgte lande i Central- og 
Østeuropa (Estland, Ungarn, Rumænien og Moldova) i et forsøg på at analysere og  
evaluere den anvendte praksis, samt komme med forslag til forbedringer og fremtidig 
udvikling i Central- og Østeuropa. 
 
 
 
 
 
